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ABSTRACT
This thesis focuses on the employment of older workers and addresses the following ques-
tions: how people make their retirement decision, how changes in the Social Security benefit
rules can encourage older workers to stay in the labor force longer, and what impediments
older workers face on the labor market that can prevent them from working longer and in-
terrupt their retirement plans. As the U.S. population ages, retirement and Social Security
claiming decisions of older workers will have a significant impact on the U.S. economy. By the
year of 2030 about 20 percent of the population will be 65 years old or older. The national
retirement system generates less income in retirement than it did in the past. Rising Full
Retirement Age, the shift of the private pension system from predominantly defined benefit
to predominantly defined contribution pension plans, and increasing longevity will have to
force older workers to stay in the labor force in the future to provide adequate income in
retirement.
Chapter one presents a dynamic stochastic retirement model that incorporates observed
heterogeneity in educational attainment level. The assumption is that educational attain-
ment level is highly correlated with the characteristics, such as preferences for work, types
of jobs, and financial planning horizon that determine timing of retirement. A parsimonious
model that incorporates heterogeneity in educational attainment level and stochastic earn-
ings and health predicts the labor force participation rates and Social Security rates by age
accurately. This model provides intuition for why college graduates tend to claim Social
Security benefits and exit labor force later in life longer life expectancy, non-physically
demanding jobs, longer financial planning horizon, and deriving positive utility from work
encourage college graduates to retire later.
Chapter two develops and tests a policy rule regarding the availability of reduced early
Social Security retirement benefits that would encourage older workers to stay in the labor
force longer without amplifying the hardship on the more vulnerable population. The avail-
ability of Social Security retirement benefits at the current Earliest Eligibility Age (EEA)
is considered the main impediment to longer working lives. Raising the EEA is thus con-
sidered the most powerful channel to raise the labor force participation rate. But raising
the EEA would create hardship among workers with low private savings who are unable to
work or find employment until the higher eligibility age. This study proposes and analyzes a
new approach to setting each worker’s EEA based on an individual’s average lifetime earn-
ingsan Elastic EEA. Low average lifetime earnings will likely reflect either poor health or
spotty work histories, both of which are associated with weak employment prospects and
limited financial resources at age 62. Tying the EEA to the average lifetime earnings could
thus protect many of these vulnerable workers while encouraging longer working lives and
increasing Social Security monthly benefits for workers more capable of remaining in the
labor force. Simulations suggest that an Elastic EEA would achieve its goal in providing
higher employment rates and levels of consumption in retirement compared to the status
quo. These simulations also demonstrate the limitations of structural retirement models
used to estimate the effect of raising the EEA. By assuming the same probabilities of losing
and finding a job for all individuals, these models underestimate the adverse effect of raising
the EEA on the more vulnerable population.
Although some older workers may like to stay longer in the labor force, they may have
hard time holding on to their jobs due to displacement. Chapter three is devoted to the
trends in displacement of older workers. Conventional wisdom says older workers are less
likely to be displaced. However, the difference in displacement rates between younger and
older workers disappeared in the 2006 Displaced Worker Survey (DWS). The increased vul-
nerability of older workers appears to be the reason for this convergence. To better under-
stand the age-displacement relationship, this study takes advantage of the availability of job
tenure information and consistent design of the DWS since 1996. Using a Blinder–Oaxaca
decomposition, it analyzes the effect of changes in tenure, industry mix, and educational
attainment on the displacement rates of younger and older workers. The results show that
older workers are now more likely to be displaced than prime-age workers, conditional on
education, manufacturing industry, and tenure.
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Abstract
As the U.S. population ages, retirement and Social Security claiming decisions of
older workers will have a significant impact on the U.S. economy. It is important
then to ask “What are the factors that determine these decisions?” Having a struc-
tural model explaining retirement decision allows researchers to analyze the effect of
alternative policies on the labor supply and claiming decisions of older workers. Until
recently, most men claimed Social Security benefits and exited the labor force at age
62, when they could first claim reduced Social Security retirement benefits, or at age
65, when the full retirement benefits were available. Previous research has found that
Social Security rules alone cannot fully explain why workers decide to retire at these
ages. As a result, researchers have introduced heterogeneity in time preferences, health
insurance coverage, unobserved heterogeneity in types of workers, and fixed costs of
work into dynamic models to explain the retirement peaks at ages 62 and 65. These
models, however, are often unwieldy. This paper develops a more parsimonious model
and replaces these myriad variables with one factor, educational attainment, in a life-
cycle model of retirement. According to the Health and Retirement Study, college
graduates have less physically demanding jobs and a longer financial planning horizon
and simply enjoy working more than non-college graduates. Thus, a simple model that
uses only education as a proxy for these characteristics and stochastic health and earn-
ings generates accurate predictions of retirement behavior. As expected, I find that
college graduates have a different attitude towards work than their non-college peers.
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1 Introduction
Until recently, most men claimed Social Security benefits and exited the labor force at
age 62, when they first became eligible for reduced Social Security retirement benefits, or at
age 65, when they were eligible for full retirement benefits. Previous research has found that
Social Security rules alone cannot fully explain the pronounced retirement spikes at ages 62
and 65.1 The question is what other factors can explain these retirement patterns. This paper
presents a simplified dynamic model of retirement behavior that incorporates heterogeneity
in educational attainment, borrowing constraints, and the actuarial adjustments2 of the
Social Security benefit formula. Replacing the myriad variables used in existing dynamic
models with educational attainment yields a model that is intuitive, replicable, and easy to
use.
Having a relatively simple dynamic model of retirement behavior is extremely important
given the aging of the population and the policy changes that will be required to eliminate
the projected deficits in Medicare and Social Security. A better understanding of retire-
ment behavior allows researchers to produce more accurate estimates of the effects of policy
changes on the labor supply and claiming decisions of older workers and their overall effect
on the U.S. economy.
Since the pioneering work of Gustman and Steinmeier (1986), the dynamic stochastic
approach has been a valuable tool to model the retirement decision and perform simulations
1An average person receives the same present discounted value of the Social Security retirement benefits
whether he claims at age 62, 63, 64, or 65 since benefits claimed before age 65 are reduced in actuarially fair
fashion to offset the longer claiming period. Thus, it is unclear why people tend to claim at ages 62 and 65.
2While reduction for early claiming of about 6.7 percent per year has been constant since early 1960, the
delayed retirement credit depends on the year an individual was born. Thus, whether benefit adjustments
are actuarially fair or not depends on individual life expectancy and the year an individual was born. See
Sass, Sun, and Webb (2007) for more details about the relationship between claiming age and fairness of
actuarial adjustments.
to estimate the effect of Social Security policy changes on the retirement decision.3 The
principal challenge of dynamic modeling of retirement behavior is to replicate pronounced
peaks in the age-retirement profile at ages 62 and 65.4 While most existing life-cycle models
agree that the spike at age 62 is largely the result of the inability to borrow against future
Social Security benefits, different retirement models present competing explanations for the
spike at age 65.5 Rust and Phelan (2000) explain the pronounced peaks at age 65 by the
actuarial unfairness of the Social Security benefit formula after age 65 and the availability of
Medicare at age 65. Gustman and Steinmeier (2002) explain the retirement spikes at ages 62
and 65 by introducing heterogeneity in time preferences. French (2005) replicates the spikes
at age 62 and 65 by combining large fixed costs of work6 with the actuarial unfairness of the
Social Security benefit formula past age 65. Van der Klaauw and Wolpin (2002) introduced
unobserved two types of workers into the model and estimated probabilities of being one
or the other type. However, all of these models are computationally intensive and hard to
understand and replicate.7 Most importantly, all of these models concentrate their attention
on financial incentives ignoring observed heterogeneity in preferences, such as a difference in
3See Rust and Phelan (1997) and Blau (2008) for detailed descriptions of the application of dynamic
stochastic programming to retirement decision modeling. French (2005) has one of the most comprehensive
models describing the labor force participation decision of older workers.
4In 1983, legislation gradually raised the full retirement age from 65 to 67. Those born in 1960 or later
can claim full benefits at age 67. For the individuals in the sample used for this paper, the highest full
retirement age is 65 years and 10 months.
5Rust and Phelan (1997) provide an excellent literature review of retirement models explaining spikes at
ages 62 and 65.
6Disutility derived from participating in the labor force, regardless of the number of hours worked.
7The primary goals of replicating any study are to be able to modify, extend, and compare the results.
While some researchers provide excellent descriptions of the modeling procedure including programming
codes (Rust and Phelan (1997), Rust (2001), and Blau (2008)), others are very vague in their descriptions
(Gustman and Steimneier (2005), French (2005)). Availability of programming codes helps other researchers
to reconstruct the model in order to modify it for their own purposes. The estimation process being nonlinear,
having multiple estimation stages and multiple stochastic components, constant revisions of public data, large
number of state and control variables, large number of rules governing thir variables, and dependency of
one variable on the others, however, make it difficult and time consuming to comprehend and reconstruct
the modeling process, especially for the researchers new to the field. For that reason, the benefits of having
a simpler model that works are 1) it could serve as a benchmark and a starting point for those trying to
investigate retirement issues and, thus, attract new researchers to the field, and 2) expand the number of
datasets to get the range of estimates for the whole population rather than particular samples.
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disutility from work8 for college graduates versus non-college graduates.
My hypothesis is that educational attainment is the main predictor of retirement behav-
ior. College graduates have a longer financial planning horizon and a better understanding
of their finances. Chan and Stevens (2003) demonstrate that responsiveness to financial
incentives, built in private pension plans and Social Security depends on the level of knowl-
edge of the rules governing these plans. Lusardi and Mitchell (2006) found a correlation
between educational attainment and financial literacy and financial literacy and retirement
wellbeing. Thus, educational attainment determines to some extent how well people respond
to financial incentives, how well people plan for retirement, and how well people prepare for
retirement.9 Moreover, education is an ideal measure: it is available from most surveys; it
can be considered exogenous10 to mid-life labor supply decisions; it is a good predictor for
other outcomes at old age, such as health11 and wealth; and it determines types of jobs and
work environment.
The structural retirement model including education is estimated using the Health and
Retirement Study (HRS).12 The HRS is a nationally representative longitudinal data set that
8Gustman and Steinmeier (2005) considered heterogeneity in leisure preferences, however, they assumed
that the unobserved heterogeneity term is drawn from a normal distribution. Van der Klaauw and Wolpin
(2002) introduced two types of workers and estimated probabilities of being one or the other type of worker.
The benefit of introducing observed heterogeneity by educational attainment levels are 1) to reduce the
number of parameters that needs to be estimated and 2) to provide intuition for the results.
9Some may say that people with a long financial planning horizon may want to attend college as positive
returns to college happen later in life. Previous literature finds, however, that ability is the strongest predictor
of educational attainment (Cawley, Heckman, and Vytlacil (2001)). It is more plausible to assume that college
graduates acquire a long planning horizon in the process of learning. Similarly, it is plausible to assume that
people with long life expectancy may decide to go to college since they will live long enough to get high return
to education. Thus, several papers demonstrate that rising longevity increases the investment in human
capital at least at the macro level (Ferreira and Pessoa (2007)). However, there is a strong interdependence
between health and education and, thus, longevity and education at the micro level (Gan and Gong (2007),
Cutler and Lleras-Muney (2006)). Following the Cutler and Lleras-Muney (2006) suggestion, I assume that
college graduates have longer life expectancy and better health due to different decision-making processes.
10Overall, education is endogenous to the labor supply decision. However, in retirement models, education
can be treated as exogenous since retirement occurs late in life.
11One of the driving forces in my model is that college graduates have a longer life expectancy than their
non-college graduate peers. Since Social Security benefit adjustments have been developed assuming average
life expectancy, college graduates are better off claiming later as they live longer.
12The Health and Retirement Study (HRS) is conducted by the Institute for Social Research (ISR) at the
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contains demographic, economic, and health information.13 In addition, the HRS contains
“point-blank” questions addressing the perception of work, types of jobs, and the financial
planning horizon that helps to substantiate the relationship between disutility of work and
education. Thus, descriptive analysis using the HRS demonstrates that 1) college graduates
are more likely to say that “work itself is the most important thing”; 2) they have less
physically demanding jobs; and 3) they have a longer financial horizon.
Estimation results demonstrate that a simple model with heterogeneous preferences by
educational attainment and stochastic earnings and health predicts labor force participation
and the claiming decision relatively well, while reducing complexity. As a result, the model
presented in this paper is easier to implement and replicate than existing models due to
fewer assumptions and lower estimation time. Estimation results also support the stated
hypothesis: college graduates have less disutility from work than non-college graduates.
While the model developed here does not explain the source of differences in preferences:
whether it is due to differences in types of work, attitude toward work, or response to financial
incentives, results demonstrate the importance of differentiating between educational groups.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents evidence supporting the hypothesis
that educational attainment is a good predictor of retirement behavior and that college
graduates enjoy work more than their non-college graduate peers. Section 3 sets up the
model. Section 4 describes the estimation procedure and presents estimated results. The
final section concludes.
10
Figure 1: Claiming Age and Employment, Men, HRS, 1992-2006.
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2 Retirement Behavior of Older Men
The age at which individuals claim Social Security benefits reveals two clear spikes.
Among the HRS sample, nearly 60 percent of male workers claim Social Security benefits at
age 62 and about 20 percent claim at age 65 (see Figure 1).14 Claiming benefits generally
means retirement in that most individuals who claim also exit the labor force. In fact, only
about 20 percent of those who claim at age 62 remain in the labor force past age 62. Overall,
fewer than 40 percent remain employed at age 65 (Figure 1). What factors determine why
some individuals claim and retire early and others delay? This section demonstrates that
educational attainment level can serve as a proxy for characteristics determining the timing
of retirement.
Table 1 shows the characteristics of male workers at age 60 by claiming age. The workers
are characterized as “early claimers” (those who claim at 62) and “delayers” (those who
claim at 63 or later). These simple descriptive statistics suggest that health status and
educational attainment are the main predictors of the claiming age and retirement decision.
Individuals in poor or fair health tend to retire early since they may find it difficult to work
in general or to find a less strenuous job. In contrast, people with college degrees tend to
claim Social Security benefits later in life. My hypothesis is that college graduates have less
disutility from work than non-college graduates. There are several explanations for these
differences in preference parameters: 1) college graduates simply enjoy working; 2) the types
of work that college graduates do allows them to stay longer in the labor force; and 3) college
University of Michigan. For more information go to http://hrsonline.isr.umich.edu/
13This study started in 1992 with about 12,650 individuals in their 50s or early 60s. Since 1992 it has been
conducted every two years and has introduced new cohorts of the aging population. Currently, it contains
information on about 30,000 individuals.
14I rounded down for those who claim in the 6th month or earlier (for example, claiming at 62 and 6
months is marked as claiming at age 62) and rounded up for the rest (claiming at 62 and 7 months is marked
as claiming at 63).
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graduates have a better understanding of the retirement income system and the benefit of
staying in the labor force longer and claiming later. The best way to introduce all these
explanations is to allow heterogeneous preferences by educational attainment.
The HRS contains questions addressing the perceptions of work, types of jobs, and the
financial planning horizon that suggest a relationship between educational attainment and
claiming and retirement behavior. Since 1992, respondents have been asked the following two
questions addressing the perceptions of work. “Some people think of their work as important
mainly because of the money. Others think of the money as less important than the work
itself. What about you?” The three possible answers were: “Work important mainly because
of the money,” “Work itself the most important thing,” and “Pros and cons.” Respondents
were asked whether they agree or disagree with the following statement: “Even if I didn’t
need the money, I would probably keep working.” The results presented in Table 2 suggest
that attitudes towards work are markedly determined by educational attainment. Half of 51-
61 year old college graduates believe that work is “the most important thing.” In contrast,
less than a third of non-college graduates share the same belief. Similarly, 75 percent of
college graduates would work even if they had enough money versus 66 percent of those
with lower educational attainment. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that college graduates
enjoy working more than their peers with lower educational attainment. My hypothesis is
that college graduates’ lower disutility from work leads them to retire at a later age than
non-college graduates.
Although some workers would like to stay in the labor force longer, the types of jobs that
they are doing may limit their ability to work longer. Thus, workers in physically demanding
jobs may have a hard time to keep up with their job requirements as they get older and their
health declines. The HRS has the question that asks how often a respondent’s “job requires
lots of physical effort.” Table 2 demonstrates that almost 60 percent of college graduates
have jobs that do not require “lots of physical effort,” while only 20 percent of those who
13
did not graduate college have non-physically demanding jobs. Heterogeneity in preference
parameters would capture the differences in job requirements.
College graduates are more likely to be financially literate and, thus, better retirement
planners (Lusardi and Mitchell (2006)). The HRS provides the following question that allows
a comparison of planning horizons among college graduates and their non-college graduate
peers: “In deciding how much of their income to spend or save, people are likely to think
about different financial planning periods. In planning your saving and spending, which
of the time periods ... is most important to you? Next few month, next year, next few
years, next 5-10 years, longer than 10 years.” Almost twice as many college graduates than
non-college graduates have planning horizons longer than 10 years, while almost twice as
many non-college graduates than college graduates have planning horizons of the next few
months. Thus, college graduates are more likely to respond to the financial incentives built
in the Social Security system than non-college graduates and work longer to sustain adequate
standard of living over the longer period. A longer planning horizon could be captured by
the smaller disutility from work for college graduates relative to non-college graduates.
Previous dynamic models that were designed to explain retirement and claiming have
generally overlooked the role of educational attainment. These models often use other char-
acteristics such as health insurance coverage and pension type (see Rust and Phelan (2002);
Gustman and Steinmeier (2005)). Individuals who delay claiming of Social Security benefits
are more likely to have health insurance from their current employer or a private pension
plan (Table 1). However, the difference of claiming behavior by health insurance coverage
is smaller than one might expect: just 6 percentage points from Table 1. Furthermore, the
observed difference in defined contribution pension coverage can hardly explain peaks in
retirement because these plans do not encourage retirement at any particular age (Munnell
et al. 2003). In contrast, the difference in educational attainment among “early takers” and
“delayers” is much larger at 11 percentage points.
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To sum up, the high retirement rate at age 62 appears to be driven by workers in poor
health and with low life expectancy who want to exit the labor force early. As workers cannot
claim Social Security benefits prior to 62 and they cannot borrow against future retirement
benefits, they wait until age 62. Healthy college graduates enjoy working and have higher
than average life expectancy. As until recently the financial incentive for the average person
to claim past age 65 was small,15 college graduates usually claimed at age 65.
To sum up, the high retirement rate at age 62 appears to be driven by workers in poor
health and with low life expectancy who want to exit the labor force early. As workers cannot
claim Social Security benefits prior to 62 and they cannot borrow against future retirement
benefits, they wait until age 62. Healthy college graduates enjoy working and have higher
than average life expectancy. As until recently the financial incentive for the average person
to claim past age 65 was small,16 college graduates usually claimed at age 65.
3 Model
3.1 Dynamic Programming Approach
In this model, an individual makes a retirement decision, such as when to claim Social
Security or whether to work or not, each period according to his own preferences given a
certain state of the world. Retirement is not an absorbing state: the agent may change his
retirement decision in the next period due to health or earnings shocks. I assume that the
claiming age is an absorbing state in that if the agent starts claiming retirement benefits,
he has to claim benefits until the end of his life. As an agent’s current decision affects his
15See Sass, Sun, and Webb (2007) for more details about the relationship between claiming age and fairness
of actuarial adjustments.
16See Sass, Sun, and Webb (2007) for more details about the relationship between claiming age and fairness
of actuarial adjustments.
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future set of choices and budget sets, he makes a decision today that maximizes his expected
discounted utility over the course of his life.
Due to the complexity of dynamic stochastic modeling, a variety of retirement models
exist that differ by both the set of state variables (St) that describe the state of the world
(such as health status and level of assets) and by the set of control or choice variables
(dt) that describe the agent’s possible actions. The choice of state and control variables
depends on the researchers’ hypotheses. In this model, an agent has two decisions: whether
to work in period t (et) and whether to claim Social Security (st), so that dt = {et, st}.
The set of observed state variables, xt, that determine budget sets and future choice sets
include health status (ht), labor income (wt), Average Indexed Earnings (AIE), an analogue
to average life-time earnings (aie), and Social Security entitlement age (at). The major
innovation is the inclusion of educational attainment (edu) as a state variable to introduce
heterogeneity. Thus, xt = {ht, wt, aie, at, edu}. The set of state variables includes the
unobserved state variable εt that is known to individuals and unobserved by econometricians
that can be interpreted as unobserved heterogeneity in agents’ preference parameters. Thus,
St = {xt, εt}. The introduction of the unobserved state variable makes it possible to reconcile
data with the constructed dynamic model.
An agent’s preferences are described by his utility function, which is a function of state
and control variables and preference parameters θ and γ. An individual chooses the optimal
sequence of choice variables dt for t = 1...T to maximize lifetime utility:
Vt(S) = max
dt
E
[ T∑
τ=t
βτ−tu(Sτ , dτ (Sτ ); θ, γ)
∣∣∣St = S] (1)
or
Vt(S) = max
dt
ut(St, dt; θ, γ) + E
[
Vt+1(St+1)|St = S, dt
]
(2)
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where the value function, Vt(S), is equal to the expected discounted utility (assuming that
agents follows the optimal policies in the future as well) and β is a time preference parameter,
which is the same for all individuals. Note that each individual’s expectations depend on
his beliefs about uncertain future events, such as probability of death, low income, etc.,
expressed as a set of transition probabilities pt(xt+1|xt, dt; δ) where δ is a set of parameters
describing beliefs.
By observing the state variables and the decisions that each individual makes in each
period of time {xit, dit}, i = 1...I, t = 1...T , one can estimate the preference parameters (θ
and γ) and transition probabilities (pt(xt+1|xt, dt; δ)) by fitting the data to the predictions of
the model. I use a two-step approach. First, I find parameters describing beliefs (δ). Then,
I substitute the obtained estimates (δˆ) into the model, solve the model using backward
recursion, and compare the moments generated by the model with the moments generated
by the data by employing the Method of Simulated Moments. I minimize the following
function:
min
(θ,γ)
g(θ, γ)′W−1g(θ, γ) (3)
where θ and γ are preference parameters, g(θ, γ) is the distance between simulated moments
and moments observed in the data, and W−1 is a weighting matrix with the observed mo-
ments along the main diagonal and zeros on the off-diagonal. Under the null hypothesis of
correct specification, the objective function has a χ2 distribution with the degrees of freedom
equal to the number of moments less the number of estimated parameters. The variance of
the parameters is calculated as:
Vˆ (θ, γ) = g′(θ, γ)′W−1g′(θ, γ) (4)
where g′(θ, γ) is a vector of the partial derivatives of the moments with respect to the
17
parameters.
3.2 Model Specification
In order to estimate the model, I make the following assumptions about the state and
control variables and agents’ preferences:
• Time (t): this is a discrete time finite horizon model starting at age 55 and ending
with death by age 110.
• Control variables (dt):
– Employment decision (et): An agent must decide whether to work (et = 1) or not
(et = 2), with a fixed labor supply. I will assume that an agent will be reemployed
with probability 1.
– Claiming decision (st): An agent must decide when to claim Social Security (1
= apply, 2 = does not apply). An individual cannot claim before age 62 due to
Social Security rules. An agent has no financial incentives to postpone claiming
after age 70, since benefits are not increased beyond this age and there is no
earnings test.
In this framework, dt ∈ Dt(xt), where Dt(xt) is the set of the agent’s possible actions
that depend on the state variables xt.
• Observed state variables (xt):
– Health status (ht): Three stochastic health states are possible at age t: 1 = good
health, 2 = bad health, and 3 = dead.
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– Earnings (wt): Earnings is stochastic and is divided into 19 equal intervals within
the range [5,000; 95,000].17 Earnings follow an AR(1) process.
– Average Indexed Earnings (AIE): The average of the 35 highest maximum tax-
able annual indexed earnings at age 60. AIE is necessary for the calculation of the
Social Security retirement benefit. AIE is divided into 10 equal intervals within
the range [0; 72,000].18 It stays constant for each period of time.
– Social Security claiming age (at): The claiming age is the age at which the agent
starts claiming Social Security benefits. It varies between ages 62 and 70. The
level of Social Security benefits is a non-linear function of the claiming age.
– Educational attainment level (edu): Individuals can be college graduates or non-
college graduates. The education level for each individual stays constant over
time.
• Unobserved state variables (εt): A shock to the utility function occurs at time t for
each feasible action at that time. The elements of εt, conditional on observed state
variables xt, are i.i.d. with a multivariate extreme value distribution. Such a restrictive
distributional assumption helps to produce an explicit functional form for the future
expected value function. In this case the probability of choosing an alternative dt has
the following representation:
Pt(dt|xt, θ, γ) = exp(vt(xt, dt, θ, γ))
Σdk∈Dt(xt) exp(vt(xt, dk, θ, γ))
(5)
where vt(xt, dt, θ, γ) = ut(xt, dt; θ, γ) + E
[
Vt+1(St+1)|St = S, dt
]
17I use self-reported earnings. The highest level of earnings in the sample is about $95,000.
18The highest AIE in the HRS sample is $72,000.
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• Utility function (ut):
ut(St, dt; θ, γ) =
1
1 + θ2
[
Cθ1L1−θ1
]1+θ2
+ ε(dt) (6)
where
L =
1 + I(working)×[
γ1 + γ2I(poorh) + γ3
t
t+ 1
+
(
γ4 + γ5
t
t+ 1
)
I(college)
]
.
(7)
I expect γ1, γ2, and γ3 to be negative. C represents utility from consumption and L
represents utility from leisure. The agent is endowed with one unit of leisure which
is diminished if the agent works. For workers, leisure diminishes even further with
age and declining health. College graduates have different disutility from work, as
their jobs are different from jobs of non-college graduates. Thus, I(working) is the
indicator function that takes the value of 1 if an agent works and 0 otherwise, I(poorh)
is the indicator function that takes the value of 1 if the agent is in poor health, and
similarly, I(college) takes the value of 1 if the agent has a college degree. Following
Rust and Phelan (1997), age has a smooth and monotonic effect on the utility via the
t
1+t
functional form. Such a specification, rather than using dummies for each age,
makes it possible to prevent the age variables from explaining retirement peaks at ages
62 and 65 themselves. Previous static reduced-form models of retirement behavior
have introduced dummies for each age to capture high retirement hazard rates at ages
62 and 65 and estimated high correlations between the age dummies and retirement
hazard (Friedberg and Webb (2003)).
• Beliefs (pt(xt+1|xt, dt; δ)): Following Phelan and Rust (1996), I assume rational ex-
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pectations and “exclusion restrictions.” The rational expectations assumption implies
that all individuals have the same beliefs that can be described by population proba-
bilities. The “exclusion restrictions” assumption implies the following decomposition
of the state variables’ transition probabilities:
pt(xt+1|xt, dt) = p1t (wt+1|wt, college, ht, aget)× p2t (ht+1|aget, ht) (8)
where p1t is an earnings transition probability function and p
2
t is a health transition
probability. Each probability function is estimated separately to find δ, the parameters
governing state variables’ transition probabilities, and then the estimates of δˆ are used
to find preference parameters in the two-step estimation approach.
To address possible criticism of the assumptions, some comments on the variable selection
and specification are in order:
• AIE is assumed to be constant. Theoretically, AIE may only increase due to higher
earnings later in life; however, the peak of earnings potential for the majority of in-
dividuals occurs before age 55. In addition, any variation in AIE may be mitigated
due to dividing AIE into intervals. Thus, the transition probability matrix for AIE is
assumed to be an identity matrix.19
• Following Phelan and Rust (1996), the current consumption level is equal to the current
level of income. This assumption avoids modeling of the consumption/savings decision.
The motivation for this assumption comes from two facts: 1) consumption is difficult to
measure; and 2) respondents have imperfect information about their retirement savings
(Gustman and Steinmeier (2001)).
19Rust and Phelan (1996) calculated a transition probability matrix for the Average Indexed Monthly
Earnings and find that diagonal elements of the matrix are at least 97 percent of each row.
21
• For simplification of the model, the retirement decision is limited to the male head of
household. Introducing the spouse’s retirement decision is left for future research.
• Since individuals’ incomes are limited to earnings and retirement benefits, agents are
assumed to receive a government transfer if earnings or retirement benefits fall below
20 percent of the poverty level.
4 Estimation Results
The parameters of interest may be divided into two distinct groups: 1) parameters de-
scribing preferences and 2) parameters describing individuals’ beliefs or expectations about
their future health and earnings. This section describes the estimation procedure of the
parameters describing beliefs and presents estimation results for both sets of parameters.
Due to a large number of parameters, a two-step approach is employed to simplify the
estimation procedure. I first estimate beliefs pt(xt+1|xt, dt; δ). I simulate agents while ran-
domly assigning their educational attainment level so that the percent of college graduates
is the same as that observed in the population. Conditional on the educational attainment
level, I assign initial health status randomly. Conditional on the educational attainment
level and initial health status, I assign AIE and initial wages that mirror the distributions to
that of the population. Using obtained estimates of beliefs and initial conditions, I simulate
10,000 agents and compare the moments of simulated agents with the moments of real indi-
viduals. The goal is to find a vector of preference parameters θ and γ that generate moments
for simulated agents similar to those observed in the data. I match labor force participation
rates between ages 56 and 70 and the percent of individuals claiming at ages between ages
62 and 70. Thus, I have 24 moments to match for each educational category.
As the estimated objective function is not monotonic and has multiple local extrema,
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traditional optimization algorithms such as hill-climbing algorithms do not work. Thus, I
use the method of simulated annealing proposed by Goffe, Ferrier, and Rogers (1994).20
4.1 Transition Probabilities
4.1.1 Labor Income
Individuals make retirement decisions based on their expectations about future earnings.
Thus, if expected earnings are low/high individuals are more/less likely to retire today. Given
a known level of earnings today, what is the probability of having low/high earnings tomor-
row? I estimate the earnings equation as an AR(1) process with other explanatory variables
in order to obtain transition probabilities for labor income. Based on the estimated param-
eters of the earnings equation, I find parameters of the distribution function of the residuals
and calculate transition probabilities using Tauchen’s (1985) approach. The distribution of
simulated labor income using estimated transition probabilities is a good approximation of
the actual labor income distribution taken from the data. Table 3 presents the results of
the log-earnings equation estimation for the sample of male workers who worked for two
consecutive periods. The estimated AR(1) process is covariance-stationary with a coefficient
of 0.844.
Following Rust and Phelan (1997), I control for the age when workers decide to claim
Social Security benefits to take into account changes in their labor supply decisions due to
the earnings test.21 Since retirement benefits are reduced if the agent earns more than a
certain threshold and for those who claim before the normal retirement age, the agent may
20French (2005) finds that in his dynamic model of labor supply and retirement decision the value function
is not concave. He uses a grid search technique to find some of the parameters for his model.
21I treat the earnings test as a tax since most individuals perceive it this way. Friedberg (2000) analyzes
the effect of the earnings test on the labor supply decision and finds that workers tend to bunch at and just
below the earnings exempt amount by reducing their number of hours worked.
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reduce the number of hours worked the earnings test minimum.22 I simulated earnings for all
possible claiming ages. That is, the agent has one earnings profile if he decides to claim at
age 62, different earnings profile if he claims at age 63, and so on. Thus, the agent takes into
account different earnings profiles depending on the claiming age before he makes a decision
to claim.
Using the Maximum Likelihood approach, the normal distribution function N(0, 0.32)
fits the distribution of the residuals from the earnings equation reasonably well. Figure 2
and Figure 3 present cumulative distribution functions of the simulated and actual earnings
and earnings averages by age.
4.1.2 Health and Mortality
This model has three possible states of health: good, bad, and dead. Using the Health and
Retirement Study, individuals reporting having “excellent”, “very good”, and “good” health
are considered in good health, and those reporting “poor” or “fair” health are cosidered in
bad health. The question of interest is: What is the probability of having good/poor health
or dying conditional on current health status? I estimated transition probabilities using
a multinomial logit model with age, age2, and a college graduate dummy as explanatory
variables conditional on the agent’s previous health status. That is, one transition matrix is
for individuals in bad health and one transition matrix for individuals in good health (see
Table 4). The distribution of health status by age using the estimated transition probabilities
produces a good approximation to the actual health status distribution. Mortality rates
obtained from the data are similar to mortality rates published by the Centers for Disease
Control in 2003.
22Another explanation for significance of the coefficients for the claiming age variables would be unob-
served heterogeneity since workers with low earnings potential claim and retire early. Having Average Index
Earnings as a state variable allows me to control for lifetime earnings potential.
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Figure 2: Cumulative Distribution Functions of Simulated and Actual Earnings, Men, HRS,
1992-2006.
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Figure 3: Mean Actual and Simulated Earnings by Age, Men, HRS, 1992-2006.
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Figure 4: Percent of People in Good Health, Bad Health, or Dead, Men, HRS, 1992-2006.
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Using these estimated parameters, I calculate transition probabilities using the following
formula:
Pr(hi = j) =
exp(Xiβj)
1 +
∑
j (Xiβj)
(9)
where Xi is a vector of individual characteristics and j ∈ {good, bad, dead}. Figure 4 com-
pares the distribution of health status by age using actual and simulated data23.
4.2 Preference Parameters
Table 5 presents estimates of preference parameters of the retirement models for the
sample of college graduates and non-college graduates without shocks to the utility function
using the Method of Simulated Moments.24 As expected, college graduates experience lower
disutility from work than non-college graduates. Workers in poor health also experience a
large disutility from work. As people get older, disutility from work rises.
Surprisingly, even this simple model specification produces quite accurate predictions of
the labor supply and claiming decisions (see Figure 5 and Figure 6). The developed model
overpredicts the decline in the labor force participation rate at age 62 by about 10 percentage
points and underpredicts the decline at age 65 by about 1.5 percentage points. As the model
does not include the savings decision nor private pensions, it overpredicts the labor force
participation rate at age 61 and underpredicts at age 62. This pattern reflects the fact that
individuals have no other sources of income and therefore are forced to claim at 62. Despite
these discrepancies, according to the χ2 goodness of fit test, differences in the simulated
moments and the moments observed in the data are negligible.
23There is both right and left censoring in the sample used to estimate health transition probabilities.
The difference in previous health status before censoring occurs is small: 22 percent of people in bad health
among non-censored observations versus 25 percent among censored observations.
24I calculate two-sided numerical partial derivatives of the moments with respect to the parameters, that
is, [θ −4θ; θ +4θ], where 4 = 1450 . Standard errors displayed in Table 5 are the larger of both directions.
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The model developed in this paper has a simple and very intuitive structure relative to
previous models. Surprisingly, it is difficult to perform a comparison of the model developed
in this paper to the previous models, and previous models to each other, to evaluate the
benefits and the costs of the various simplifications and assumptions. Different forms of
the utility function and differences in the sets of state and choice variables prevent direct
comparison of the estimates and the impact of the estimates on the retirement decision.
None of the previous models (except Rust and Phelan (1997) and the model presented
here) provide a comparison of the actual and estimated distribution of the claiming age:
an outcome of great interest to policymakers. While claiming ages and the labor force
participation decision are strongly correlated, changes in Social Security rules may affect
this relationship. Gustman and Steinmeier (2005) provide the comparison of observed and
simulated retirement hazard by age from full-time work only and report a discrepancy of 2
percentage points in the retirement hazard at age 62.
Assuming a fixed number of hours worked and the functional form of the utility function
in this paper, the model presented here is a simplified version of the model in French (2005).
However, two key assumptions in French (2005) prevent a direct comparison. First, French
(2005) estimates time endowment ranging from 3399 to 4889 hours per year depending on the
model specification, rather than normalizing to some constant.25 Second, his assumption26
that benefits from private pension plans start at age 62 most likely drives the drop in the
labor force participation at age 62 rather than Social Security rules. He finds that poor
health has a very small effect on labor force participation, contrary to what Gustman and
Steinmeier (2005) and the model developed here find. A relatively high share of people who
claim and retire at age 62 are in poor health. These observations suggest that the decline in
the labor force participation in French (2005) is due to his assumption about the availability
25Traditionally, researchers normalize time endowment to some constant, such as, 1, 24, or number of
hours per year less than number of hours sleeping.
26Page 406, French (2005).
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of private pension benefits.
The estimates presented in Table 5 support the hypothesis that college graduates enjoy
less disutility from work than non-college graduates. The coefficient on the college dummy
is twice the size of the constant for the disutility from work. Thus, the effect of rising
generosity of Social Security benefits since 1970 on labor force participation at age 65 has
been mitigated by rising educational attainment. That is, the decline in the labor force
participation between 1965 and 1985 would have been even greater were it not for the rise
in educational attainment.27 Thus, ignoring changes in educational attainment over time
would underestimate the impact of Social Security reforms.
5 Conclusion
The principal challenge of the dynamic modeling of retirement behavior is to replicate
pronounced peaks in the age-retirement profile at ages 62 and 65.28 While most of the existing
literature agrees that the high retirement hazard rate at age 62 is due to the inability to
borrow against future Social Security retirement benefits, different retirement models present
competing explanations for the spike at age 65. Most retirement models are complex, making
them hard to interpret and replicate.
This paper proposes a simple dynamic stochastic model that incorporates heterogeneity
in educational attainment, stochastic earnings and health. Its hypothesis is that college
graduates enjoy work and, thus, they stay in the labor force longer and claim Social Security
benefits later. Since for an average person credit for claiming later (delayed retirement credit)
27A forthcoming study by Munnell et al. (2008) reaches a similar conclusion and finds that trends in
nation’s health improvement in the U.S. have been affected by the rise in educational attainment.
28Since early claiming reduces benefits to offset a longer claiming period, making total benefits actuarially
fair, researchers have been puzzled by the drastic decline in the retirement hazard rate between ages 62 and
65.
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Figure 5: Percent Working by Age for Both Educational Groups, Men, HRS, 1992-2006.
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Figure 6: Density of Claiming Age for Both Educational Groups, Men, HRS, 1992-2006.
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does not offset the shorter claiming period, college graduates claim at age 65. In addition, as
benefit adjustments are actuarially fair for an individual with average life expectancy, those
with shorter/longer life expectancy would benefit by claiming earlier/later. The simple
model presented in this paper allows for different health transition probabilities for different
educational groups. Therefore, college graduates have a longer life expectancy than their
peers with lower educational attainment.29
Surprisingly, this simple model generates quite accurate predictions of retirement behav-
ior. While more comprehensive models produce better predictions, the model presented here
is more intuitive, less computationally intensive, and easier to replicate and extend.
29See Cutler et al. (2006) for the link between education and health.
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Table 1: Individuals’ Characteristics at Age 60 by Claiming Age, Men, HRS, 1992-2006.
62 > 62
Characteristic: Mean SD Mean SD
First age observed in the survey 57.61 4.28 59.21 4.34
Last age observed in the survey 70.88 4.03 72.50 3.89
College degree 0.18 0.39 0.29 0.45
Poor/fair health status 0.16 0.37 0.10 0.29
Average index earnings, median 24,607 11,003 23,014 10,081
Household wealth, median 74,611 322,297 56,949 382,378
Work status 0.64 0.48 0.93 0.25
Accumulated number of covered quarters by age 55 126 27 121 28
Employer’s health insurance in retirement 0.60 0.49 0.57 0.50
Covered by DB plan on a current job∗ 0.40 0.45 0.45 0.50
Covered by DC plan on a current job∗ 0.27 0.39 0.38 0.49
Number of observations 670 465
Number of observations at age 60 496 303
Note that number of observation and number of observation at age 60 do not coincide
as some respondents entered the survey at later ages. Thus, variables at age 60 are missing.
∗ - variable has missing values for non-working individuals.
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Table 2: Self-reported Perception of Work, Job Requirements, and Financial Planning Hori-
zon, Men, HRS, 1992.
Educational attainment College Less than college
Some people think of their work as important mainly because of the money.
Others think of the money as less important than the work itself.
Work important mainly because of the money 29% 51%
Work itself the most important thing 50% 30%
Pros and cons 21% 19%
Even if I didn’t need the money, I would probably keep working.
Strongly agree 19% 13%
Agree 55% 54%
Disagree 18% 24%
Strongly disagree 7% 9%
My job requires lots of physical efforts.
All or almost all of the time 6% 29%
Most of the time 7% 23%
Some of the time 31% 28%
None or almost none of the time 56% 20%
Financial planning horizon.
Next few month 10% 18%
Next year 8% 11%
Next few years 29% 34%
Next 5-10 years 38% 30%
Longer than 10 years 14% 8%
Note: Sample includes male respondents between ages 51 and 61 for the first and fourth questions.
Sample includes male workers for the second and third questions only.
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Table 3: Regression estimation of the male log earnings equation, HRS, 1992-2006.
Variable Coeff. SE
Age 0.042 0.044
Age2 -0.0004 0.0004
College graduate 0.053∗∗ 0.012
Poor/fair health dummy -0.038∗∗ 0.015
Log previous earnings 0.844∗∗ 0.011
Claiming age at 62 -0.208∗∗ 0.024
Claiming age at 63 -0.169∗∗ 0.038
Claiming age at 64 -0.099∗ 0.039
Claiming age at 65 and later -0.058∗ 0.024
Constant 0.431 1.310
N 5041
R-squared 0.8026
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
Table 4: Multinomial Logit Model of Health Status, HRS, 1992-2006.
Previous health status Good Bad
Outcome Variable Coeff. SE Coeff. SE
Bad Age 1.977∗∗ 0.110 -1.659∗∗ 0.115
Age2 -0.015∗∗ 0.001 0.013∗∗ 0.001
College graduate -0.879∗∗ 0.065 -0.439∗∗ 0.078
Constant -65.837∗∗ 3.566 55.219∗∗ 3.753
Dead Age 2.184∗∗ 0.297 0.469 0.315
Age2 -0.017∗∗ 0.002 -0.003 0.002
College graduate -0.460∗∗ 0.154 -0.586∗ 0.229
Constant -75.747∗∗ 9.680 -17.669† 10.325
N 57556 16080
Log likelihood -9716.487 -6310.356
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
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Table 5: Preference Parameter Estimates.
Parameter Coeff. SE
θ1 - consumption weight 0.2479 0.008
θ2 - coefficient of relative risk aversion -0.8550 0.097
Leisure lost if working:
γ1 - constant -0.2108 0.011
γ2 - poor health -0.5266 0.133
γ3 - age -0.2521 0.007
γ4 - college 0.4673 0.016
γ5 - age*college -0.5222 0.018
Calibration:
β - time discount factor 0.98
Goodness of fit (41 df) : χ2 1.6196
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Tying the Social Security’s Earliest Eligibility Age to Lifetime Earnings
Natalia A. Zhivan∗†
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Abstract
Will older Americans work longer if we raise Social Security’s Earliest Eligibility
Age, and can we do so in a way that would avoid amplifying the hardship on the
more vulnerable population? As the national retirement income system generates
less income in retirement than it did in the past, working longer is perhaps the best
option to guarantee an adequate income in retirement. Availability of Social Security
retirement benefits at the current Earliest Eligibility Age (EEA) is considered the
main impediment to longer working lives. Raising the EEA is thus considered the
most powerful channel to raise the labor force participation rate. But raising the
EEA would create hardship among workers with low private savings who are unable to
work or find employment until the higher eligibility age. The idea of raising the EEA
has been widely debated in the literature. This debate has produced two proposals
that would raise the EEA to age 64 for all workers and that would tie each worker’s
EEA to the length of their working years. Both proposals, however, fail to protect
vulnerable workers. This study proposes and analyzes a new approach to setting each
worker’s EEA based on an individual’s average lifetime earnings. Using data from
the Health and Retirement Study, this paper demonstrates that low average lifetime
earnings are associated with poor health, weak employment prospects, and limited
financial resources at age 62. Using a dynamic stochastic retirement model developed
by Zhivan (2008b), this paper addresses the following issues regarding an Elastic EEA
relative to policy alternatives. To what degree does it 1) result in workers staying in
the labor force longer, 2) result in a higher level of retirement benefits, consumption,
and utility, and 3) reduce the number of potential federal aid recipients. Simulations
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†I would like to thank Kit Baum, Norma B. Coe, Donald Cox, Richard W. Kopcke, Alicia H. Munnell,
Steve Sass, and Robert Triest for their valuable advice. All errors are mine. Comments are welcome.
suggest that an Elastic EEA would achieve its goal in providing higher employment
rates and levels of consumption in retirement compared to the status quo. Simulations
also demonstrate the limitations of structural retirement models used to estimate the
effect of raising the EEA. By assuming the same probabilities of losing and finding
a job for all individuals, these models underestimate the adverse effect of raising the
EEA on the more vulnerable population.
JEL Classification Codes: H55, J26
Keywords: Earliest Eligibility Age, Elastic EEA, Social Security, retirement model, Social Security
claiming decision
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1 Introduction
The contraction of the national retirement income system, along with several other fac-
tors, raises concerns among older workers about the adequacy of their retirement wealth.1
“Working longer” slogans fill current publications on retirement as the key remedy to falling
financial security in retirement (Munnell and Sass (2008)). The question is what can be
done to encourage longer working lives? The availability of Social Security retirement bene-
fits at the current Earliest Eligibility Age (EEA) is considered the main impediment to any
attempt to encourage longer working lives. About 50 percent of the population claims Social
Security benefits at age 62, the current level of the EEA, when reduced retirement benefits
are first available. Most individuals who claim early also exit the labor force early. Thus,
reforming the EEA is considered the most powerful tool that the government could use to
encourage longer working lives. This study proposes a new approach for setting the EEA
that would encourage older individuals to stay in the labor force longer while minimizing
harm to the more vulnerable population. Using the Health and Retirement Study, this study
demonstrates the connection between average lifetime earnings and the risk of belonging to
the more vulnerable group of workers, thus providing a rationale for setting individual EEAs.
Using a dynamic stochastic retirement model developed by Zhivan (2008b), this paper then
analyzes the behavioral response of older workers and performs a welfare analysis of the new
policy rule.
As the U.S. population ages and national retirement income contracts, the current labor
force participation trend would leave growing numbers of retirees in poverty and create
1The national retirement income system is contracting and is generating less income in retirement than it
did in the past because 1) the Full Retirement Age is rising from age 65 to 67, thus, cutting benefits claimed
at any age, and 2) the nature of private pensions has changed from predominantly defined benefit plans to
predominantly defined contribution plans. Households save less for retirement under defined contribution
compared to defined benefit pension plans (Munnell and Sass (2008)).
additional pressure on already strained social programs. The Full Retirement Age (FRA)
when the full retirement benefits are available is rising from age 65 to 67, leaving workers
and their spouses that claim at age 62 at risk of having very low incomes later in life. Life
expectancy at age 65 for males has risen from 13.1 years in 1950 to 17.5 years in 2007 (SSA,
2008). The corresponding numbers for women are 16.2 years in 1950 to 19.8 years in 2007.
Given the current trend in retirement and rising longevity, future workers will have to save
more to be able to finance more years in retirement. The alternative is longer working lives.
According to Munnell and Sass (2008), an additional three or four years in the labor force
could offset the effect of the contraction of the retirement income system. Raising the EEA
is generally seen as the most effective tool for extending working lives. As the government
ultimately bears responsibility through social welfare programs for the retirees that fail to
achieve an adequate standard of living in retirement, policymakers should address changes
in the EEA sooner rather than later.
The idea of raising the EEA has been widely debated in the literature, producing two
main proposals.2 One would raise the EEA uniformly to age 64, while a second would raise
the EEA for most workers, but allow a lower EEA for who have been in the labor force
for many years. The traditional approach is to raise the EEA to age 64 for all individuals
in line with the rise in the FRA (Gustman and Steinmeier (2002), French (2005)). Such a
change, however, could create a serious hardship for workers with health problems and/or
physically demanding jobs who are unable to work later in life. Other proposals for having
“adjustable” EEAs would tie the Earliest Eligibility Age to the length of a worker’s labor
force participation (Haverstick et al. (2007)). The notion is that more vulnerable workers
2Favreault et al. (2006) suggest that keeping the EEA at age 62 and setting minimum benefits would
assure low-wage workers who retire early a basic income. However, it would disregard the tendency of early
claiming and retiring behavior among workers capable of staying in the labor force. Another approach is to
conduct an educational campaign that would alert all workers of the benefits of claiming later, and fixing
the minimum survivor benefit at the spouse’s Full Retirement Age benefit, paid for by further reducing early
retirement benefits, which would combat myopia and assure widows and widowers higher monthly incomes
(Sass, Sun, and Webb (2007)).
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generally have long careers — they generally have a high school education or less, go to work
early, have physically demanding jobs, and are not in a good position to keep working past
age 62. But such proposals, while seemingly intuitive and relatively easy to implement, fail
to produce the desired outcomes. The individuals that need greater income protection often
have lower labor-force participation3 due to higher employment volatility than do healthier
and more successful workers (Favreault and Steuerle (2008)).
This study proposes another approach to setting the EEA in terms of its ability to encour-
age longer working lives while protecting the more vulnerable members of the population.
The idea is to base the individual’s EEA on their Average Indexed Earnings (AIE) at age 55.
Low average lifetime earnings will likely reflect either poor health or spotty work histories,
both of which are associated with weak employment prospects and limited financial resources
at age 62. A worker’s ability to work and find a job generally does not change suddenly from
age 55 to age 62. Therefore, a worker’s AIE at 55 is a reasonably good measure of the
worker’s employment prospects at 62. In addition, workers with low lifetime earnings are
unlikely to have accumulated sufficient financial assets to support themselves until eligible
for Social Security benefits at age 64. Tying the EEA to the AIE could thus protect many
of these vulnerable workers while encouraging longer working lives and increasing Social
Security monthly benefits for workers more capable of remaining in the labor force.
This study uses data from the Health and Retirement Study4 to demonstrate the cor-
relation between Average Indexed Earnings and the risk of belonging to a more vulnerable
group of workers. The study then uses a dynamic stochastic retirement model, developed by
3Labor force participation is measured by the Social Security program as the number of covered quarters
that determine eligibility for Social Security benefits.
4The HRS is a nationally representative longitudinal data set that contains demographic, economic, and
health information. This study started in 1992 with about 12,650 individuals in their 50s or early 60s.
Since 1992 it has been conducted every two years and has introduced new cohorts of the aging popula-
tion. Currently, it contains information on about 30,000 individuals. The current analysis is limited to a
sample of men. As most women have interrupted work histories some modifications to the policy rule is
required to take into years spent caring for young children and elderly parents. For more information go to
http://hrsonline.isr.umich.edu/.
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Zhivan (2008b), to analyze the behavioral response of older individuals and to perform a wel-
fare analysis of the new policy rule. This model will allow comparisons of the policy-relevant
outcomes of the Elastic EEA relative to a uniform EEA at ages 62 or 64. In particular, it will
indicate the degree to which the Elastic EEA, relative to other policy rules, 1) results in older
workers staying in the labor force longer, 2) provides a higher level of retirement benefits,
consumption, and utility, and 3) reduces the number of potential federal aid recipients.
Simulations based on the model by Zhivan (2008b) suggest that an Elastic EEA would
encourage longer working lives and increase workers’ consumption level in retirement. The
proposed policy rule would also allow workers with low earnings potential to retire early.
While increasing the average level of consumption in retirement, an Elastic EEA does not
reduce poverty in retirement since low life-time earners would claim reduced Social Security
benefits. However, none of the existing proposals regarding the EEA can improve the stan-
dard of living of the more vulnerable population except by providing a minimum level of
benefits for those falling below the poverty level. Thus, the combination of an Elastic EEA
with the expansion of other social programs could be a feasible policy to encourage longer
working lives.
Simulations also demonstrate the limitation of structural retirement models, which have
been used to estimate the effect of raising the EEA. Models assuming the same probabilities
of losing and finding a job for all individuals underestimate the adverse effect of raising the
EEA on the more vulnerable members of the population. Thus, modeling heterogeneity in
job opportunities is an essential part of evaluating the distributional aspect of any EEA
policy rule. Unfortunately, differences in labor market demand for workers with different
earnings potentials have not been well documented.
The paper proceeds as follow. Section 2 describes arguments for and against raising
the EEA. Section 3 proposes an Elastic EEA rule that assigns different EEAs to different
individuals based on their Average Indexed Earnings. Section 4 analyzes the behavioral
46
response to the proposed policy and welfare analysis using a dynamic model. Section 5
concludes.
2 Arguments Relating to the EEA
Proponents of raising the Earliest Eligibility Age (EEA) argue that such a policy would
encourage longer working lives and maintain adequacy of Social Security-based retirement
income. Working longer prevents premature depletion of retirement savings and provides
current income. Overall, given workers’ rising longevity and the declining share of physically
demanding jobs, later retirement seems a reasonable way to provide financial security in
retirement. Opponents, on the other hand, believe that raising the EEA would hurt workers
who find it difficult to work due to poor health or poor job prospects, and are likely to have
inadequate savings to fund a deferral of their benefits.
2.1 Pro: Improved Retirement Security
While Social Security income is not intended to be the only source of income in retirement,
about one-third of the households receiving Social Security derive 90 percent or more of
their income from this program (SSA, 2006). However, a low earner — a worker making
45 percent of the national average wage all his life — receives an annual benefit of $9,685
at the Full Retirement Age (FRA): an amount that barely exceeds the poverty threshold
(see Table 1). The benefits of average and high earners — workers making 100 and 160
percent of the national average wage respectively — at the FRA are well above the poverty
threshold. With the FRA at age 67, however, early claimed benefits, actuarially reduced to
offset the longer period of benefits receipt, approach or even fall below the poverty threshold
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for all types of workers. The problem is illustrated in Table 1. Retirement benefits for a
low earner would replace 71 percent of poverty line income if claimed at 62. The average
earner would be less than 20 percent above the poverty threshold, while a high earner would
receive approximately 50 percent more that the poverty line if they claim benefits at age
62. Postponing the claiming decision until age 64 would clearly improve retirement income
security. Average and high earners would get 1.35 and 1.75 of the poverty line if claimed
at age 64. However, a low earner would still fall 20 percent short of this minimum required
standard of living in retirement.
2.2 Pro: Working Longer
Raising the EEA would encourage longer working lives. The contraction of the national
retirement income system along with several other factors raise a concern among older work-
ers about the adequacy of their retirement wealth. The “working longer” slogan fills current
publications on retirement as the key remedy to falling financial security in retirement.
Availability of early retirement benefits, however, encourages early exit from the labor force
(Samwick (1998), Rust et al. (1997)). Zhivan (2008b) finds that only about 20 percent of
early claimants stay in the labor force until age 65. If the EEA were to be raised to age 64,
one recent study estimates that about 60 percent of those who currently retire at 62 would
retire at 64 (Gustman and Steinmeier (2005)). In addition to raising these workers’ monthly
Social Security benefits, their earnings from work would directly increase current income and
delay the draw-down of private retirement savings.
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Table 1: Annual Social Security Benefit by Claiming Age if the FRA in 2005 were 67.
Claimed at 67 Claimed at 64 Claimed at 62
Earner type: Benefit % of poverty Benefit % of poverty Benefit % of poverty
Low earner $9,685 101 $7,748 81 $6,780 71
Average earner 16,189 169 12,951 135 11,332 118
High earner 20,942 219 16,753 175 14,659 153
Note: National average wage was $36,953 in 2005. The poverty threshold for a one-person household
in 2005 was $9,570. By the definition of the Social Security Administration, a low earner makes 45
percent, an average earner 100 percent, and a high earner 160 percent of the national average wage.
Source: Author’s calculation based on SSA national average wage information
and the 2006 OASDI Trustees Report.
Table 2: Incidence if Risk Factors at Age 63 for Men by Claiming Age, HRS, 1992-2006.
Characteristics Claimed at 62 Claimed at 63 or later
Work-limiting health conditions 20% 10%
High-school diploma or less 62 50
Ever applied for DI or SSI 10 4
Subjective probability of not living to age 75 (median) 30 20
Note: Sample includes all male respondents for whom claiming age and health as of age 63 are observed
excluding those who had a longest job in public administration and those who receives DI.
Source: Author’s calculation from the HRS, 1992-2006.
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2.3 Con: Hardship for Those at Risk
The most important argument against raising the EEA is that it would create hardship for
those who find it difficult to work in their early 60s due to poor health or poor job prospects.
Individuals with high earnings potential could save enough early in life outside the Social
Security system to support themselves for an additional two years in case of poor health
or poor job opportunities. Low-income individuals with serious health problems could rely
on Social Security disability benefits (DI) during this period. However, low-income workers
with insufficient assets, unqualified for DI, and with poor job prospects could find it difficult
to support themselves until age 64 without government support. Indeed, health problems
and weak labor-market prospects are quite common among workers who claim at age 62.
Roughly 20 percent of all men who claim at age 62 report a work-limiting health condition,
as opposed to 10 percent of men who claim later (Table 2). About two-thirds of these early
takers have a high school diploma or less. Older workers with low educational attainment
have especially poor job prospects (Mosisa and Hipple, 2006) and are disproportionately
prone to displacement (Munnell et al. 2008). Less educated older workers are also less likely
to have adequate private pensions or other financial resources (Lundberg et al. 2000). Raising
the EEA would thus require workers with health and labor-market problems to prolong
their work lives or have inadequate incomes until age 64. Even under the current Social
Security rules a larger percent of early takers applied for DI or SSI versus those claiming
later. Raising the EEA could significantly increase the number of people turning to Social
Security Disability Income (DI), Supplemental Security Income (SSI) or social services, all
of which are cumbersome and expensive to administer, discourage work or saving, and often
stigmatize participants.
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2.4 Con: Unfairness to Groups with Short Life Expectancy
Raising the EEA is unfair to workers with a below-average life expectancy, such as low-
wage workers and African-American men. Forcing workers with average life expectancy to
claim at age 64 rather than age 62 does not reduce the value of lifetime benefits, but it does
reduce the value of lifetime benefits for workers with below-average life expectancy, such
as these two cohorts. According to Table 2 early takers expect shorter lives compared to
those claiming later. Because such workers receive benefits over a shorter period of time, the
lifetime value of benefits claimed at any age is less than the value received by workers with a
greater life expectancy. But the disparity is greater for benefits claimed at age 64 than age 62
because the two-year reduction in benefit receipts represents a greater share of a shorter life
expectancy. If the EEA were raised from age 62 to 64, the lifetime value of a given monthly
benefit claimed at the EEA by African-American men would fall from 89 to 87 percent of
the value received by whites. Workers in the lower half of the earnings distribution do not
receive the same monthly benefits as workers in the top half of the distribution. But if they
did, the lifetime value of benefits claimed at the EEA by workers in the bottom half of the
distribution would fall from 83 to 81 percent of the value received by workers in the top half
of the distribution.5
5Life expectancy for 60 year-old men is 18 years for African-Americans and 21 years for whites (Centers
for Disease Control, 2003). Life expectancy for 60 year-old men is 20 years for workers in the bottom half of
the earnings distribution and 25 years for workers in the top half of the distribution (Waldron, 2007). The
lifetime value of a given monthly benefit is calculated using a 3 percent real interest rate.
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3 Setting Social Security’s Earliest Eligibility Age Based
on Lifetime Earnings
The policy objectives for reforming the EEA are to improve retirement income security
while minimizing the hardship and unfairness it creates. The traditional approach would
raise the EEA and address the adverse effects using other public programs or by changing
other features of the Social Security program.6 The alternative is an Elastic EEA, which
assigns different workers different earliest claiming ages, based on a rule that achieves these
policy objectives.
3.1 Average Lifetime Earnings as a Predictor of Being Vulnerable
in Old Age
An Elastic EEA could potentially raise the earliest claiming age for most workers while
shielding those for whom a higher EEA would result in hardship or an unfair loss of benefits.
A key concern is how to assign EEAs to accomplish this objective. The idea is based on the
observation that individuals in poor health at age 63 have earnings lower than earnings of
healthy individuals over the entire course of their lives (Figure 1).7 On the one hand, this
6The adverse effects of a higher EEA could be addressed by adjustments in other public programs. The
hardship could be mitigated by expanding the Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) and Supplemental
Security Income (SSI) programs or other social welfare programs. The unfairness could be offset within
a larger package of reforms that produced a more even overall distribution of gains and losses, such as
adjustments or offsets to the payroll tax or to a further increase in the FRA, which disproportionately hurts
higher earners (Munnell, et al. 2004; Mermin and Steuerle, 2007). But expanding DI, SSI, or public means-
tested programs is messy, costly, and often poorly targeted and inconsistently applied (Autor and Duggan,
2006). And no large package of Social Security or welfare reforms that include such offsets to unfairness
is working its way through Congress. So while the adverse effects of a higher EEA could be mitigated by
changes in other public programs, this approach to raising the EEA has gained little traction.
7“Healthy” refers to individuals reporting good, very good, or excellent health. “Unhealthy” refers to
individuals reporting fair or poor health. Health status is measured at age 63.
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Figure 1: Median Covered Earnings by Health Status at Age 63, HRS, 1992-2004
Table 3: Incidence if Risk Factors at Age 63 for Men, by Ratio of Average Indexed Earnings
(AIE) to National Average Earnings (NAE), HRS, 1992-2006.
Characteristics AIE<50% NAE 50-100% NAE AIE>100% NAE
Poor/fair health 33% 26% 13%
Work-limiting health conditions 30 19 15
Less than high-school diploma 44 38 20
Ever applied for DI or SSI 24 11 5
Subjective probability of not living to age
75 (median)
50 40 30
Financial assets less than 2 years’ earnings 44 50 32
Percent of men with the ratio 12 16 72
Note: The ratio of Average Indexed Earnings to National Average Earnings is calculated when the worker
is age 55. Sample includes male workers with earnings histories excluding those with the longest job in
public administration and those receiving DI.
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correlation could be explained by the fact that unhealthy workers have poor job opportu-
nities. On the other hand, it is also consistent with the hypothesis that low earnings cause
poor health. Sullivan and von Wachter (2006) show that job loss reduces life expectancy.
One possible explanation is that lack of access to health insurance, unhealthy life style due
to low earnings, and stress associated with volatile employment may have a negative impact
on health. In addition, it is well known that workers with low educational attainment have
earnings lower than of college graduates over the course of their lives. Since low educated
workers have poor job prospects at older ages, tying the EEA to Average Indexed Earnings
protects this type of worker. Thus, an Elastic EEA would protect both groups of people:
those who cannot work due to poor health and those who cannot find employment in old
age. Protecting such workers from a general increase in the EEA would improve retirement
income security while mitigating the hardship and unfairness such a change would otherwise
produce.
Table 3 shows the relationship between estimated average lifetime earnings at age 55,
as measured by AIE relative to the national average wage, both as calculated by the Social
Security Administration, and various worker characteristics at age 63 that could create hard-
ship or unfairness should the EEA be raised. The method used to estimate average lifetime
earnings is biased downward for certain workers. This bias occurs because the AIE calcula-
tion includes only earnings covered by the Social Security program and does not count wages
earned abroad (either by immigrants or U.S. workers employed outside the United States) or
wages earned while employed by a state or local government not covered by Social Security.8
Nevertheless, low average lifetime earnings, as given by this measure, are clearly associated
with a lack of financial assets, fair or poor health, a work-limiting health condition, low ed-
ucational attainment, subjective life expectancy (which has been shown to be a reasonably
8We do exclude workers whose longest job, as recorded by the HRS, is employment in state or local
government.
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good indicator of actual life expectancy) and ever having applied for DI or SSI benefits.
An elastic EEA based on average lifetime earnings thus seems capable of addressing the
issues of hardship and fairness. As the Social Security Administration already calculates
average indexed earnings for each worker, an elastic EEA based on average indexed earnings
would be reasonably easy to implement.
3.2 An Elastic EEA
A simple example of an EEA based on average indexed earnings (AIE) is shown in
Figure 2. For workers with AIE of 50 percent of the national average earnings or less, the
earliest claiming age could remain at 62. For workers with AIE equal to or greater than
the national average wage, the earliest age of claiming would rise to 64. For workers with
AIE between 50 and 100 percent of national average earnings, the earliest age of claiming
would rise by a month for each 0.48 percentage point increase in AIE above 50 percent of
the national average earnings. For example, a worker with an AIE equal to 75 percent of
the national average earnings could claim at 63 (25 x .48 = 12 months).9
This simple specification would be reasonably successful in achieving policy objectives
for reforming the EEA. As shown in Table 3, the earliest claiming age would rise to 64 for
close to 70 percent of men, with fewer than 15 percent eligible at 62. About 80 percent of
current early claimers would have to wait for at least another year to claim Social Security.
Each worker’s earliest claiming age should be set early enough so that workers could
adjust their retirement plans. In the example presented below, EEAs are based on a worker’s
AIE relative to the national average wage at age 55. There is not much change in men’s
AIE (relative to national average earnings) between 55 and 62 (Rust and Phelan (1997)),
9Gradually raising the EEA avoids abrupt changes in eligibility in response to minor changes in earnings,
dampening the moral hazard that workers would reduce earnings to qualify for benefits earlier.
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Figure 2: Example of an Elastic EEA based on Average Lifetime Earnings
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their EEA would generally be much the same whether set at 55 or 62. Notifying workers of
their EEA at age 56 would also function as a “wake-up call” to plan for retirement.10 At
the same time, calculating AIE at age 55 eliminates the need to deal with a moral hazard
problem where individuals intentionally reduce labor supply to reduce AIE. Individuals are
unlikely to agree voluntarily to receive low lifetime earnings just to reduce the eligibility age
by two years.
4 Behavioral Response to the Introduction of an Elas-
tic EEA
Will older Americans work longer and live better under an Elastic EEA? A life cycle
model of retirement developed by Zhivan (2008) can provide crude estimates of the effect of
an Elastic EEA on the employment decision, level of consumption and overall utility, and
federal finances.11 Having the same trajectories for the evolution of health and earnings, I
simulate the employment and claiming decisions for each individual using three scenarios:
1) the EEA is set at age 62, 2) the EEA is set at age 64, and 3) the EEA is set for each
individual based on his average life-time earnings. Thus, differences in policy rules of setting
the EEA are the only source of differences in outcomes of all three simulations. This section
summarizes the stochastic dynamic model of retirement and provides estimates of the Elastic
EEA effects on the well-being of older Americans. Due to the simplicity of the model’s
specification, the following results are suggestive. But these simulations provide a clear
graphical illustration of the pros and cons of raising the EEA and limitations of existing
10Setting the EEA much earlier might not be useful, as most men in their mid fifties have a financial
planning horizon of less than five years (Haverstick et al. 2007).
11See Rust (2001) for the discussion of such a “controlled experiment” using a life-cycle approach.
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structural retirement models.
4.1 The Life-Cycle Model of Retirement
In this model an individual makes a retirement decision, such as when to claim Social
Security or whether to work or not, in each period according to his own preferences given a
certain state of the world. Retirement is not an absorbing state: the agent may change his
retirement decision in the next period due to health or earnings shocks. I assume that the
claiming age is an absorbing state in that if the agent starts claiming retirement benefits,
he must claim benefits until the end of his life. As an agent’s current decision affects his
future set of choices and budget sets, he makes a decision today that maximizes his expected
discounted utility over the course of his life. The set of state variables includes the following
variables: health status, earnings, average indexed earnings, Social Security claiming age,
and educational attainment level. The control variables are the employment and claiming
decisions.
4.2 The Labor Force Participation Decision
Figure 3 shows the effect of raising the EEA on the employment decision of older workers
using different policy rules. As we would expect, setting the EEA at age 64 would encourage
workers to stay employed until they can start claiming Social Security benefits. Similarly,
the employment rate of older workers under the Elastic EEA policy rule is higher compared
to the current policy rule and lower compared to a fixed EEA at age 64. However, the
differences in the employment rates between the EEA at age 64 and the Elastic EEA are
only one and ten percentage points at ages 62 and 63, respectively. Thus, this simulation
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Figure 3: Percent Working by Age: Simulations.
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suggests that an Elastic EEA would achieve its goal in encouraging longer working lives
nearly as well as would setting the EEA at age 64. Interestingly, a slightly large share of
older workers would prefer to retire after age 65 under any new policy rule compared to the
status quo. A higher level of retirement benefits due to later claiming ages could explain
lower employment rates in later years.
4.3 The Claiming Decision
Figure 4 shows the effect of raising the EEA on the claiming decision of older workers
using different policy rules. We would expect to see workers who were forced to postpone the
claiming decision to claim as soon as benefits are available. Indeed, the percent of people
claiming at age 64 would jump from 13 to 66 percent if the EEA is raised to age 64 for
everyone. However, not everyone who is eligible to claim benefits at age 62 under the Elastic
EEA would do so. According to the simulation, 26 percent of people would have their EEA
set at age 62 and 25 percent at age 63.12 Only nine percent of older workers claim benefits at
age 62 and 16 percent at age 63 under the Elastic EEA.13 Thus, this simulation supports a
common perception that low-income people who are able to work do postpone the claiming
decision, while those in poor health or unable to find employment are forced to claim as soon
as benefits become available. Raising the EEA to age 64 for everybody would hurt these
nine percent of workers who would claim at 62 and 16 percent that would claim at 63 under
an Elastic EEA. Thus, this simulation suggests that an Elastic EEA would achieve its goal
in protecting the most vulnerable workers who cannot continue to work.
12Simulation eligibility numbers are slightly different from those of Table 3 due to discretization of the
Average Indexed Earnings (AIE) state variable. In addition, the Elastic EEA is proposed to be calculated
on a monthly basis, while the dynamic model calculates EEA on an annual basis.
13Characteristics of simulated agents by claiming status show that all of the 9 percent of people who decide
claim at age 62 under the Elastic EEA have poor health.
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Figure 4: Claiming Age: Simulations.
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4.4 Welfare Analysis
The idea behind raising the EEA is to prevent people from claiming reduced benefits and
to increase the overall level of consumption by claiming full rather than actuarially reduced
retirement benefits and staying longer in the labor force. However, since the proposed policy
rules are more restrictive than the status quo, workers are expected to experience a decline
in their level of utility at some ages and an increase at others.
Figure 5 shows the effect of raising the EEA on the level of retirement benefits under
different policy rules. Under the status quo the average level of retirement benefits is about
$10,000, which is consistent with the average level of benefits reported by the Social Security
Administration in 1998.14 Setting the EEA at age 64 produces a higher average level of
retirement benefits by about ten percent at age 66 compared to the status quo. Allowing
low life-time earners to claim benefits at age 62 under the Elastic EEA would produce an
average level of retirement benefits that is about seven percent higher that we observed in
1998.
Figure 6 shows the effect of raising the EEA on the overall level of consumption under
different policy rules. The overall level of consumption is higher due to a higher level of
retirement benefits. In addition, the average level of consumption is higher for workers in
their early 60s as they stay employed and receive income from work. Thus, this simulation
suggests that an Elastic EEA would achieve its goal in providing a higher level of consumption
in the economy compared to the status quo.
Figure 7 shows the effect of raising the EEA on the current level of utility under different
policy rules. The average level of utility is declining until workers become eligible for Social
Security retirement benefits. Although older workers would prefer to retire early, they are
14According to SSA (2005), average monthly benefit for 1998 was $780, which amounts to $9,360 a year.
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Figure 5: Level of Retirement Benefits: Simulation.
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Figure 6: Current Level of Consumption: Simulation.
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Figure 7: Current Level of Utility: Simulation.
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unable to borrow against future Social Security benefits and must wait until they are eligible.
Thus, this figure illustrates the explanation for the peak in retirement at age 62. As the
proposed policy rules force older workers to postpone their claiming decision, their level of
consumption and level of utility is higher during their retirement years compared to the
status quo. Thus, this simulation suggests that an Elastic EEA would achieve its goal in
providing a higher level of utility in retirement years compared to the status quo.
Figure 7 also demonstrates that an Elastic EEA would adversely affect the level of utility
during workers’ early 60s to lesser extend compared to the EEA at age 64.
4.5 Fiscal Impact and Poverty
The purpose of raising the EEA is to assure retirees a more adequate guaranteed monthly
income. Because Social Security benefits are actuarially adjusted, raising the EEA would
achieve that objective with little direct increase in program costs.15 An elastic EEA would
result in a modest increase in the cost of providing Social Security retirement benefits.16
However, an across-the-board increase in the EEA can be expected to increase other gov-
ernment expenditures. As shown in Table 3, 24 percent of low life-time earners have applied
for DI or SSI benefits at some point in their lives. Requiring such workers to wait to 64 to
access Social Security retirement benefits can be expected to result in increased government
expenditures on such “safety-net” programs. It is far from clear whether these increased
expenditures, over the long-term, would be greater or less than the increased expenditures
15Raising the EEA would increase program costs to the extent that it increased survivor benefits, which
are not factored into the actuarial adjustment. On the other hand, raising the EEA would improve Social
Security’s cash flow by postponing benefit payments.
16Costs would rise under an elastic EEA because low earners, with a relatively low life expectancy, would
not have their lifetime benefits reduced via a shortened period of benefit receipt, while the lifetime benefits
of high earners would rise, due to their relatively long life expectancy, as their higher monthly benefits more
than offset the shortened period of benefit receipt. The increase would be modest because the change in the
value of lifetime benefits for low earners relative to high earners resulting from an increase in the EEA, as
pointed out above, is small.
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Figure 8: Poverty rates: Simulation.
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on an elastic EEA.17
Figure 8 shows the effect of raising the EEA on the number of potential federal aid
recipients under different policy rules. The percent of people below the poverty level is
calculated to determine the adverse effect of each policy and address the most important
critique of raising the EEA. The simulation overstates the percent of people below the poverty
level as the model considers only income from earnings and individuals’ own Social Security
benefits, ignoring other sources of income, such as Social Security benefits of the spouse. As
the poverty threshold for a couple is only slightly higher the threshold for a single individual,
adding spousal retirement benefits would produce lower poverty rates.18 Interestingly, the
profile of the poverty rate by age is consistent with data reported by the U.S. Census Bureau
(1999) — poverty rates are high for individuals in their late 50s and early 60s, falling for
individuals in their mid to late 60s, and rising after that.
This result exposes the limitations of all of the existing structural models analyzing
retirement behavior. Setting the EEA at age 64 produces the lowest poverty rates, which is
contradictory to the common perception. The reason behind such an inconsistency between
the model and real data is the assumption that all individuals have the same probabilities
of losing and finding a job. However, low-income and older individuals tend to have poorer
job opportunities relative to high income and prime-age individuals. According to the U.S.
17While an elastic EEA could protect at-risk workers from hardships associated with delayed eligibility,
it would not protect such workers from the meager benefits paid to low-wage workers at age 62. An option
that would address this concern would be to fix the EEA benefit at 80 percent of the FRA benefit. This
would clearly increase program costs and worsen Social Security’s long-term financing shortfall. On the other
hand, it would reduce the incentive to claim Disability Insurance benefits. The monthly DI benefit is the
worker’s monthly FRA benefit. When the FRA is 67, the DI benefit will be 43 percent higher than the age-62
retirement benefit, but it would be only 25 percent higher if the EEA benefit were fixed at 80 percent of
the FRA benefit. Fixing the EEA benefit would also “flatten” the Social Security program, making benefits
claimed prior to the FRA less sensitive to average lifetime earnings. This could be valuable as policymakers
seek ways to close Social Security’s financing shortfall by cutting benefits while preserving a minimal level
of benefit adequacy.
18The poverty threshold was about $8,000 for a single individual and $10,000 for a couple. Since wives
receive at least 50 percent of the husband’s benefit, the model would produce lower poverty rates if spousal
benefits are considered. The actual poverty rate for those 65 and older was about 10 percent over the last
10 years (http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/histpov/perindex.html).
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Department of Labor (1998), the unemployment rate in 1998 was 7.1 percent for those with
less than a high school degree, four percent for high school graduates, and only 1.8 percent for
college graduates. A forthcoming study by Munnell et al. (2008) shows that older workers
have a higher displacement rate relative to prime-age workers. Thus, current structural
retirement models estimating the effect of raising the EEA to age 64 ignore the fact that
older and low-income individuals have poor job opportunities and thus underestimate the
adverse effect of raising the EEA.
By allowing low life-time earners to claim Social Security benefits at an earlier age, an
Elastic EEA would produce the same level of poverty in retirement as the current policy
rule produces. Regardless of any EEA policy rule, the only way to help low life-time earners
is to expand other public programs that would provide some minimum level of benefits. As
Table 1 shows, a low earner would receive only 80 percent of the poverty line even if they
postpone the claiming decision until age 64. As the current model does not allow for a saving
decision, the poverty rates at ages 62 and 63 are the highest under the Elastic EEA, as high
life-time earners in poor health chose to retire and consume the minimum guaranteed level
of income without access to their private savings. Adding a saving decision to the model
presented in Zhivan (2008) would reduce the poverty rates at these ages. The assumption of
equal job opportunities for all workers prevents from properly analyzing the advantages of
Elastic EEA in protecting the most vulnerable population compared to a fixed EEA at age
64.
5 Conclusion
As national retirement income contracts and life expectancy increases, raising the Earliest
Eligibility Age is an inevitable step toward encouraging longer working lives. The question is
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can we do so in a way that minimizes the negative effects on the most vulnerable population?
Raising the EEA to age 64 would create hardship among workers with low private savings
who are unable to work or find employment until the higher eligibility age. This study
suggests that tying the individual’s EEA to their Average Indexed Earnings is a feasible
policy rule that would encourage longer working lives while protecting the most vulnerable
population. While an Elastic EEA should be complemented with public assistance programs
that would address inadequacy of retirement income of those claiming early, tying the EEA
to AIE is a better alternative than raising the EEA to 64 for two reasons. First, income of
those who claim early could be boosted under the Elastic EEA rather than replaced under
the EEA at 64 before workers are eligible to receive the Social Security benefits. Second,
some low-income individuals would prefer to claim own reduced benefits under the Elastic
EEA rather than apply for welfare benefits under the EEA at age 64 due to stigma associated
with relying on public assistance.19
Simulations based on the model by Zhivan (2008b) suggest that an Elastic EEA would
1) postpone the claiming decision for the majority of workers; 2) increase the average level
of benefits, consumption, and utility during their retirement years; and 3) allow vulnerable
workers to claim benefits early. Simulations also demonstrate the limitation of existing
structural retirement models’ estimates of the effect of raising the EEA. Models assuming
the same probabilities of losing and finding a job for all individuals underestimate the adverse
effect of raising the EEA on the most vulnerable population. Thus, modeling heterogeneity
in job opportunities is an essential part of evaluating the distributional aspect of any EEA
policy rule. Unfortunately, differences in labor market demand for workers with different
earnings potentials are not well documented.
19One way to boost reduced Social Security benefits under an Elastic EEA is to apply less than actuarially
fair adjustments for low-income individuals. Since low-income individuals tend to have low life expectancy,
this approach should have a modest effect on the costs of the program.
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Abstract
Conventional wisdom says older workers are less likely to be displaced. However,
the difference in displacement rates between younger and older workers disappeared in
the 2006 Displaced Worker Survey (DWS). The increased vulnerability of older work-
ers appears to be the reason for this convergence. This is troublesome, as continued
employment of older workers is increasingly critical to their ability to gain a secure re-
tirement, given a contracting retirement income system and increased life expectancy.
To better understand the age-displacement relationship, this study takes advantage of
the availability of job tenure information and consistent design of the DWS since 1996.
Using a Blinder–Oaxaca decomposition, it analyzes the effect of changes in tenure, in-
dustry mix, and educational attainment on the displacement rates of younger and older
workers. The results show that older workers are now more likely to be displaced than
prime-age workers, conditional on education, manufacturing industry, and tenure. The
results also show that declining tenure, a weakened relationship between educational
attainment and displacement, and a higher incidence of displacement in manufacturing
for older workers were important contributors to the convergence of displacement rates
of older and younger workers. The results also suggest an explanation for the puzzling
stability of the overall displacement rate in the world of declining tenure. The upward
pressure on overall displacement risk, created by declining tenure, was largely offset
by the declining share of employment in manufacturing industries with unusually high
dislocation rates.
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1 Introduction
Conventional wisdom says that older workers are less likely to be displaced than younger
workers. However, the difference in displacement rates between younger and older work-
ers has disappeared, according to the 2006 Displaced Worker Survey (Figure 1), and the
increased vulnerability of older workers seems to be the reason. The question is what
might explain such changes in the relative displacement rates of older and younger workers.
Changes in tenure, industry mix, and educational attainment are likely explanations.1 This
paper provides a descriptive analysis that explores the relationship between job loss, age,
and these three explanatory factors over the period 1996-2006 using the biennial Displaced
Worker Supplement (DWS) to the Current Population Survey (CPS).2
Displacement, while painful for all workers, is especially challenging for older workers.
Older workers who are displaced are less likely to be reemployed, have less time to adjust their
retirement plans, and are more likely to retire prematurely. With a contracting retirement
income system3 and increased life expectancy, the continued employment of older workers is
also increasingly critical to their ability to ensure a secure retirement.
Previously, researchers presumed that tenure, not age per se, protected older workers from
1The shift in the nature of pension coverage could affect the displacement rate of older workers as well.
The shift from defined benefit to defined contribution pensions makes older workers more attractive for
employers. The lack of data prevents further investigation of the relationship between pension type and
displacement.
2The data reported below come from the 1984-2004 Displaced Worker Supplements (DWSs), which were
conducted as part of the January Current Population Survey in 1984, 1986, 1988, 1992, 2002, 2004, and 2006
and the February CPSs in 1994, 1996, 1998, and 2000. There have been changes in the design of the survey,
such as change in recall period in 1992 and wording in 1994. Following the now-standard approach in the
literature, in our sample we consider displaced only those who lost their jobs for the following three reasons:
plant closing, insufficient work, and position or shift was abolished.
3The Full Retirement Age (FRA) when the full retirement benefits are available is rising from age 65
to 67, which is analogous to a cut in benefits at each point in time. In addition, the nature of private
pension plans has changed from being predominantly defined benefits plans to being predominantly defined
contribution plans. Munnell and Sass (2008) show that workers save less with defined contribution compared
to defined benefit pension plans.
Figure 1: Displacement Rates by Age, CPS 1984-2006.
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displacement (Farber (1997), (2003), and (2005), Rodriguez and Zavodny (2000)). However,
lack of data on job tenure prevented researchers from exploring the age-displacement and
tenure-displacement relationships. If tenure is a sufficient explanation of the lower rate
of job displacement among older workers, it is also puzzling that displacement has not
increased until recently, given that job tenure has noticeably declined over the last 30 years
(Munnell and Sass (2008), Farber (2006), Munnell et al. (2006)). Rodriguez and Zavodny
(2000) have analyzed the effect of rising educational attainment and changing industry mix
on the displacement of older workers between 1983-1987 and 1993-1997. They found that
improved educational attainment and the shift from goods producing to service producing
jobs have reduced displacement. However, since manufacturing jobs tend to be long tenured,
the estimated effect of the change in industry mix may be biased due to lack of data on
tenure. Furthermore, the change in the design of the DWS in 1994 may have obscured key
relationships in previous analyses of the displacement trends (Farber (1997, 2003, 2005),
Rodriguez and Zavodny (2000)).4
This study builds on the work of Rodriguez and Zavodny (2000) and Farber (2005)
by analyzing the effect of changes in tenure, industry mix, and educational attainment on
the displacement of older workers. The study takes advantage of the availability of job
tenure information for all workers and the consistent design of the DWS between 1996 and
2006. Using a Blinder–Oaxaca decomposition, the study analyzes the effect of changes in
tenure, educational attainment, and manufacturing’s share of employment—and changes in
the effect of these factors—on the overall displacement rate and on the displacement rates
of older and prime-age workers (workers aged 50-64 and 35-49, respectively). Some earlier
studies compared older workers with workers in their twenties and early thirties. As such
workers cannot accumulate tenure comparable to older workers (see the Appendix for the
4Katharine Abraham in her comments to Farber (1997a) discuses some of the limitations of the corrections
of the DWSs. See Farber (1997a) pp.135-141 for more details.
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distribution of tenure by age), the effects of tenure and age cannot be separately identified
in such specifications.5
Comparing older and prime-age workers, the analysis finds that at the beginning of the
10-year period the two groups had the same probability of job loss, controlling for industry,
tenure, and educational attainment, but older workers are now more likely to be displaced.6
The increased educational attainment of older workers relative to prime-age workers did not
provide them with greater security due to the fading relationship between education and
displacement. Declining tenure, a weakened relationship between educational attainment
and displacement, and a higher incidence of displacement in manufacturing for older workers
were important contributors to the convergence of displacement rates of older and younger
workers.
Changes in the design of the DWS prevent a similar decomposition of dislocation prior to
1993, when changes in educational attainment, industry mix, and tenure were much larger.
Due to the short time span and small changes observed in tenure, educational attainment,
and industry mix, these findings are more suggestive than conclusive. However, this study
suggests that a solution to the puzzle—why dislocation rates have been relatively stable while
tenure has declined—appears to be the decline in the share of employment in manufacturing.
These findings have two main implications. First, labor demand may help explain lower
labor force participation rates among workers approaching retirement relative to prime-age
workers. The fact that older workers are now more likely to be displaced than prime-age
workers, controlling for tenure, education, and other demographic characteristics, suggests
that older workers are discriminated against in the labor market. While discrimination of
older workers has been difficult to test empirically, the common perception of discrimination
5Previous studies, such as Rodriguez and Zavodny (2000) and Farber (1993), use 20 year olds as the
omitted group.
6The changes in unobserved characteristics of older workers could explain the raise in the displacement
rates of older workers as well. Thus, the types of jobs that older workers choose may change over time and
cause a higher rate of displacement rather than declining demand for older workers.
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is if anything more true today than in the past.7 Second, structural models of labor market
behavior should differentiate between prime-age and older workers when modeling the prob-
ability of job loss. In such models, the higher share of non-employed older workers is thus
attributed to preferences—such as the rising utility of leisure with age—rather than higher
displacement rates or other labor demand considerations.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 documents new trends in the displacement of
older workers and offers explanations for the observed trends. Section 3 provides descriptive
regression analysis of the displacement and a Blinder–Oaxaca decomposition to assess the
importance of changes in education, industry mix, and job tenure and changes in their effects
on the displacement of older and prime-age workers. Section 4 concludes.
2 Factors Influencing Displacement of Older Workers
Previous research has identified tenure, industry mix, and educational attainment, all of
which have changed over the last 20 years, as factors that affect the risk of displacement:
• Job Tenure. One reason why older workers were thought to have lower displacement
rates than younger workers is because they generally have longer job tenure and, as a
result, have accumulated more firm-specific human capital (Becker (1975)). Employ-
ers would be reluctant to lay off older workers because they would lose firm-specific
human capital and would be forced to train new workers. Farber (2006) documents a
significant decline in long-term employment relationships, especially for older workers,
narrowing the gap in tenure between younger and older workers. Data from the Mobil-
ity Supplement of the CPS show that the median tenure of workers age 50-64 has fallen
7Another explanation for higher probability of displacement is the type of jobs older workers choose that
we do not observe.
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from a high of 13 years in 1983 to 10 years in 2006 while median tenure for 35-49 year
old workers has declined from 7 to 5 years (see Table 1).8 While a secular decline in
long-term employment relationships should increase the overall displacement rate, the
declining tenure gap could explain why older workers, relative to prime-age workers,
became more vulnerable to displacement.
• Share of Jobs in Manufacturing. Manufacturing has a displacement rate twice as
high as the rest of the economy (Kletzer (1998)). Thus the overall displacement rate
should have declined with the declining share of jobs in manufacturing, from about
23 percent of employment in 1984 to 13 percent in 2006 (see Table 1). This decline
in manufacturing could also increase the dislocation rate of older relative to younger
workers as older workers tend to be concentrated in declining industries. Manufacturing
jobs also tend to be long-tenured jobs. So the shift from manufacturing to services-
producing industries may also have contributed to the decline in tenure.
• Educational Attainment. Between 1984 and 2006, the educational attainment of older
workers improved dramatically. The percentage of those 50-64 with a bachelor’s degree
or higher has doubled (see Table 1). More importantly, even though the educational
attainment of each cohort traditionally surpassed that of earlier cohorts, the discrep-
ancy between the educational attainment of older and younger cohorts has essentially
disappeared. Older workers now look very much like younger workers in terms of
educational attainment. Since displacement rates decline as educational attainment
rises, the rising attainment of older workers should reduce their displacement rate and
the elimination of the gap in educational attainment should have increased the gap in
displacement rates between younger and older workers.
8Average tenure has sharply decreased over time for men, while that for women has increased slightly.
On balance, however, overall combined tenure has declined.
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3 Changes in Worker Characteristics and Their Effects
on Displacement Risk
To analyze trends in the relationships between workers’ characteristics and displacement
over time, this study first estimates a linear probability model of displacement in 1993-1997,
1997-2001, and 2001-2005 samples corresponding to 1996-1998, 2000-2002, and 2004-2006
DWSs respectively. The result of this exercise produces coefficients that give the effect of
these characteristics in these three periods. Using a Blinder–Oaxaca decomposition, this
study then estimates the net effect of the changes in tenure, educational attainment, and
industry mix on the overall displacement rate and on the displacement rate of older and
prime-age workers. As each of the three periods analyzed include periods of growth and of
recession, the displacement experience in each does not reflect unique cyclical conditions.9
This study takes advantage of the addition of job tenure information in DWS from 1996
to 2006, which gives information about displacement from 1993 to 2005. While the DWS
has been conducted since 1984, changes in the survey design before 1996 impede the analysis
of trends prior to that year. Unfortunately, most of the sizable changes in educational
attainment, industry mix, and tenure occurred before 1996. For example, the share of
workers aged 35-49 in manufacturing dropped from 22 to 13 percent from 1984 to 2006,
with only 4 percentage points of this decline occurring between 1993-1997 and 2001-2005.
The percent of high school drop-outs in the population aged 50-64 has fallen from 33 to
13 percent, with only 7 percentage points of this decline occurring between 1993-1997 and
2001-2005.10 However, the availability of tenure data and the consistency in the recall period
9Period 1993-1997 corresponds to 1996-1998 DWSs, 1997-2001 and 2001-2005 correspond to 2000-2002 and
2004-2006 DWSs respectively. We combined periods of growth and recession, so that the overall displacement
rate is about the same across years. Note that the total displacement rate for 1993-1997 was 8.5 percent,
1997-2001 was 8.1, and 2001-2005 was 8.6.
10Note that characteristics from Table 1 may not correspond to characteristics in Table 8 as Table 1
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and survey wording justify a focus on the abbreviated time period.
3.1 Changing Relationships between Characteristics and Displace-
ment
We estimated the following linear probability models of displacement11 in 1993-1997,
1997-2001, and 2001-2005 (Table 2):
yit = xitβt + φt + it (1)
where yit is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the individual i is displaced in the last
three years prior to the survey at time t for reasons of plant closure, position abolished, or
slack work and zero otherwise, xit is a set of characteristics of the individual i in the period
t, φt is a year fixed effect, and it is an identically distributed idiosyncratic shock with zero
mean. Due to the cross-sectional nature of the data, we make the strong assumption that
unobserved characteristics of individuals conditional on observed characteristics have zero
expected value.
Regression results for the initial 1993-1997 period, as we would expect, show college
graduates, public sector workers, and workers with long job tenure are less likely to be
is based on the March Supplement and Table 8 is based on the January Supplement to the CPS. The
January Supplement is representative of the workforce rather than the overall population. While Table 1 is
constructed to demonstrate trends in population, Table 8 facilitates a Blinder–Oaxaca decomposition.
11A binomial probit model is more appropriate to estimate the probability of being displaced than the linear
probability model since estimates of the linear probability model can predict probabilities that are greater
than one and below zero and error terms of the linear probability model are heteroskedastic. However,
we use estimates of the linear probability model to perform a Blinder–Oaxaca decomposition. A linear
probability model allows estimating the independent contribution of each characteristic to the change in
the displacement rate in a Blinder–Oaxaca decomposition, while the contribution of each characteristic in a
probit model depends on the distribution of other characteristics. While the assumption of the independence
of each characteristic’s contribution is somewhat unrealistic, it eliminates the need to fix the distribution of
other characteristics at some particular values.
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displaced than workers with lower levels of educational attainment, individuals working in
the private sector, and workers with shorter tenure (Table 2). Additionally, workers in
manufacturing faced a higher likelihood of displacement than workers in other industries.
Conditional on tenure, the results also show that older workers and prime-age workers had
the same probability of job loss (see Appendix for the results without controls for tenure).
All of these relationships are statistically significant.
Regression results for the later periods indicate a change in the relationship between
certain characteristics and the probability of displacement. While a college degree continued
to shield workers from displacement, the negative correlation between displacement and
educational attainment declined. Between 1993-1997 and 2001-2005, the difference in the
likelihood of displacement between college and high school graduates dropped from 1.8 to
0.9 percentage points. Workers in manufacturing, on the other hand, have become more
vulnerable over time. Their increased likelihood of displacement, relative to workers in other
industries, has risen from 2.1 to 6.7 percentage points. The effect of tenure on displacement
has not changed over time despite the declining number of long-tenured jobs. Finally, older
workers were more likely to be displaced, controlling for education, tenure, manufacturing
industry, and public sector. While older and prime-age workers had essentially the same
likelihood of displacement in 1993-1997, their risk of displacement increased in subsequent
periods.
Table 3 shows regression results for prime-age and older workers separately. Regression
results of the displacement model for older and prime-age workers demonstrate the same
trends with one exception: college graduates are not shielded from displacement within ei-
ther group, conditional on tenure and manufacturing industry (Table 3).12 This finding
12We tried different specifications of the probability model of displacement. Models that did not control for
industry and public sector produced statistically significant negative relationships between being a college
graduate and displacement. Inclusion of manufacturing and public sector variables gave a statistically
insignificant relationship between having college degree and displacement, as we observe in Table 3. Indeed,
the public sector tends to have a high concentration of college graduates and is associated with very low
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contradicts the conventional wisdom that educational attainment shields workers from dis-
placement and that rising educational attainment would reduce displacement risks. One
possible explanation is that accumulated firm-specific human capital is more valuable than
generic human capital at this stage of people’s careers, at least in terms of protection against
displacement. In addition, the results show that older workers have a higher increased risk
of displacement in manufacturing compared to prime-age workers: 8.5 versus 6.5 percentage
points higher than workers in non-manufacturing private sector industries. Interestingly, the
effect of tenure in reducing displacement became somewhat stronger for prime-age workers
while showing little change for older workers with more than five years of tenure. For older
workers with less than one year of tenure, however, the risk of displacement has risen.
3.2 Blinder–Oaxaca Decomposition of the Change in the Inci-
dence of Displacement
The regression results presented in the previous section show how the relationship be-
tween certain worker characteristics and the probability of displacement changed among
older and prime-age workers. The analysis, however, ignores changes between 1993-1997
and 2001-2005 in the characteristics of the workforce. This section presents the results of a
Blinder–Oaxaca decomposition to estimate the separate and combined effects of the change
in worker characteristics and the above-estimated change in the effects of these characteris-
tics on displacement: that is, the separate and combined effects of the change in the means
and the change in the coefficients of the explanatory variables.
Using the Blinder–Oaxaca decomposition, the change in the displacement rate is written
as follows:
displacement rate, while the declining manufacturing sector tends to employ workers with high school degree
and has a displacement rate twice as high as the rest of the economy (Kletzer (1998)).
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Y¯01−05 − Y¯93−97 =
[
X¯01−05 − X¯93−97
]
βˆ01−05 + X¯01−05
[
βˆ01−05 − βˆ93−97
]
+
[
X¯01−05 − X¯93−97
][
βˆ93−97 − βˆ01−05
] (2)
where Y¯01−05 − Y¯93−97 is the difference in the displacement rate between 2001-2005 and
1993-1997. The first right-hand term,
[
X¯01−05 − X¯93−97
]
βˆ01−05, the so-called “endowment
effect,” estimates the effect of the change in workers’ characteristics on the change in the
displacement rate. It gives the hypothetical change in the displacement rate had the work-
force in 2001-2005 had the characteristics of the workforce in 1993-1997. The second term,
X¯01−05
[
βˆ01−05 − βˆ93−97
]
, estimates the effect of changes in the coefficients produced by the
regressions discussed in the previous section; it gives the hypothetical change in the displace-
ment rate in 2001-2005 had relationships between displacement and workforce characteristics
in 2001-2005 been the same as in 1993-1997. X¯01−05
[
βˆ01−05− βˆ93−97
]
also captures the effect
of differences in unobserved characteristics, for example, the types of jobs that older work-
ers held in 2001-2005 may be different from the types of jobs held in 1993-1997. The final
right-hand term,
[
X¯01−05 − X¯93−97
][
βˆ93−97 − βˆ01−05
]
accounts for the fact the means and
coefficients change simultaneously. Results of the decomposition are presented in Table 4,
with the change in the variable means presented in the Appendix.
The difference between the displacement rates of 1993-1997 and 2001-2005 is 0.09 percent-
age points, and not significantly from zero. According to the results of the Blinder–Oaxaca
decomposition, the displacement rate in 2001-2005 was reduced by 0.21 percentage points
because workers had different levels of education, tenure, industry mix, and other charac-
teristics than workers in 1993-1997. However, because the effect of these characteristics
changed, according to this analysis, the displacement rate in 2001-2005 was raised by 0.20
percentage points.
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Breaking down the change by variables using the Blinder–Oaxaca decomposition shows
the contribution the change in the level (endowment) and effect (coefficient) of each char-
acteristic on the incidence of displacement. For the share of employment in manufacturing,
the “endowment effect” is the percentage point change in the share of workers in manufac-
turing (-4.5 percentage points, the decline from 18.7 percent in 1993-1997 to 14.2 percent
in 2001-2005, as shown in the Appendix) multiplied by the effect of the share of employ-
ment in manufacturing on displacement in 2001-2005 (0.067, as shown in Table 2), or -0.30
(-4.5*0.067, as shown in Table 4). Similarly, the “coefficient effect” multiplies the change in
the coefficient relating the share of employment in manufacturing to displacement (0.046,
the rise from 0.021 in 1993-1997 to 0.067 in 2001-2005, as shown in Table 2) by the share
of manufacturing in employment in 2001-2005 (14.2, as shown in the Appendix), or 0.66
(0.046*14.2, as shown in Table 4). The interaction between the change in endowment and
the change in the coefficient resulted in an increase in the incidence of displacement by 0.21
percentage points (Table 4). Thus, the overall effect of the share of employment in manufac-
turing raised the incidence of displacement by 0.57 percentage points between 1993-97 and
2001-2005 (Table 5).
Contrary to our expectations, increased educational attainment had no significant impact
on the incidence of displacement. Table 4 presents the effect of each educational category on
the displacement rate, while Table 5 shows the effect of all educational categories combined.
The “endowment effect” of educational attainment lowered the displacement rate by 0.03
percentage points (Table 5). Despite significant increase in educational attainment, the
“endowment effect” is not very strong due to the very small effect of educational attainment
on the probability of displacement in 2001-2005. Indeed, the “coefficient effect” raised the
displacement rate by 0.24 percentage points and more than offset the negative “endowment
effect”.13 Including the “interaction effect,” the overall effect of educational attainment was
13Note that the differences between results presented in Tables 4 and 5 are due to rounding.
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to raise the displacement rate 0.17 percentage points, although this result is not statistically
significant.
It is difficult to see the extent to which the decline in tenure since the early 1980s affected
displacement due to the small changes in job tenure during the period under review. While
the percentage of the workers with 10 or more years of tenure declined from 28.7 to 28.3
percent, the percent of workers with less than one year of tenure declined from 9.9 to 9.0
percent (see the Appendix). The overall “endowment effect” is negative and small due to
the smaller number of people with short tenure (the “endowment effect” of having less than
one year of tenure (9.0-9.9)*0.023 plus effect of having 5-10 years of tenure (22.3-21.2)*-0.06
plus effect of having 10 or more years of tenure (28.3-28.7)*-0.08). The “coefficient effect” of
tenure on displacement has slightly strengthened, producing a 0.22 percentage point decline
in the displacement rate (Table 5), while the “interaction effect” has been negligible. The
overall effect of tenure has been negative and marginally significant. However, the change
in tenure during this short period of time is non-representative of the change that occurred
in the 1980’s and 1990’s (Table 1). We believe that the decline in tenure created an upward
pressure on the displacement rate over the last 20 years: an effect that is difficult to measure
due to design changes of the DWS and lack of information on tenure.
Decomposition of the displacement rate by age also helps explain the convergence in the
displacement rates of younger and older workers.14 As seen in Table 5, the factors under
review caused little change in the displacement rate for prime-age workers but significantly
raised displacement among older workers. In both groups, the effects in manufacturing raised
displacement in both groups, by 0.55 and 0.68 percentage points for prime-age and older
workers respectively. However, among prime-age workers tenure effects reduced displacement
while among older workers the effects of both tenure and educational attainment further
increased the incidence of displacement.
14Means are presented in the Appendix. Coefficients by age are presented in Table 3.
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The effects identified by the decomposition by age are surprising, as tenure declined and
educational attainment rose among both groups (Table 1). But the ability of these factors to
affect displacement changed in different ways. The ability of tenure to reduce displacement,
the “coefficient effect”, became stronger for prime-age workers and more than offset its
decline in that age group. Thus, the overall effect of tenure lowered the displacement rate
for prime-age workers by 0.30 percentage points and increased the displacement rate for older
workers by 0.12 percentage points.
The effect of educational attainment for older workers is counterintuitive. As Table 3
demonstrates, conditional on manufacturing industry and public sector, older college grad-
uates are more likely to be displaced in 2001-2005, although the coefficient is insignificant
(Table 3). Thus, while being insignificant, the “endowment effect” of increased educational
attainment has raised displacement rates by 0.06 percentage points rather than reduced them
for older workers. While the relationship between educational attainment and displacement
has weakened for prime-age workers, this relationship has worsened for older workers. Thus,
the “coefficient effect” has an upward effect on the displacement for older workers. While
the overall effect of educational attainment for prime-age workers has increased displace-
ment rates by 0.02 percentage points, older workers have experienced a 0.29 percentage
point increase in the incidence of displacement (Table 5).
While the overall effects of educational attainment and tenure have been insignificant for
prime-age and older workers, the combination of these effects with the effect of manufacturing
on displacement made a difference. While the tenure effect has diminished the upward effect
of manufacturing for prime-age workers, tenure and educational attainment effects reinforced
the upward effect of manufacturing on the displacement for older workers.
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4 Conclusion
Using consistent data on the displaced workers and tenure information for all workers
available since 1996 in the Displaced Worker Survey, this analysis shows that conditional
on tenure, industry, and education, older workers have become more likely to be displaced.
Declining tenure, higher risk of displacement in manufacturing, and worsened relationship
between educational attainment and displacement helps explain increased incidence of dis-
placement for older workers. While prime-age workers have experienced an increasing inci-
dence of displacement in the manufacturing sector as well, the strengthened effect of tenure
on displacement and a weakened relationship between educational attainment and displace-
ment have offset the effect of manufacturing on displacement. A surprising result is that for
older and prime-age workers having a college degree has no significant effect on displacement
after controlling for manufacturing and the public sector.
An increased incidence of displacement for older workers is bad news. Given the contrac-
tion of national retirement income and rising longevity, working longer is the main approach
of guaranteeing an adequate standard of living in retirement. Displacement leads to pre-
mature retirement (Stevens and Chan (2001)) and a lower standard of living in retirement
(Johnson, Mermin, Uccello (2005)). Moreover, most policies encouraging longer working
lives, such as raising the Social Security’s Earliest Eligibility Age from 62 to 64, target labor
supply. These policies will have limited success given that labor demand considerations are
also responsible for a lower labor force participation rate of older workers.
The changes in manufacturing, tenure, and educational attainment during the last ten
years are only a small fraction of the changes that occurred since the early 1980s. Changes in
the design of the DWS prevent us from using a longer period of time to investigate the trends
in displacement in more detail. However, this study suggests that a solution to the puzzle—
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why dislocation rates have been relatively stable while tenure has declined—appears to be the
decline in the share of employment in manufacturing. The “endowment effect” of the decline
in manufacturing clearly reduces displacement, offsetting the rise in displacement resulting
from declining tenure.15 While employment in manufacturing is relatively long-tenured, the
decline in tenure does not just reflect the decline of manufacturing, as tenure declined in all
industries. If both the decline in tenure and the decline of the manufacturing sector reflect
a common factor, such as technological change or rising educational attainment, then the
effects of this common factor on displacement seem to be largely offsetting.
15The overall effect of manufacturing would have this effect only if its “coefficient effect” over the earlier
period of time, unlike the period under review, did not reverse the “endowment effect.”
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Table 1: Characteristics of the Workforce by Age, CPS 1984-2006.
1984 2006
Characteristic: Age 35-49 Age 50-64 Age 35-49 Age 50-64
Percent of high school drop-outs 18% 33% 14% 13%
Percent with college degree 23 15 30 30
Job tenure, median 7 13 5 10
Percent working in manufacturing 22 23 13 13
Note: There is no tenure information in 1984. Job Tenure and Mobility Supplement in 1983
has been used to calculate tenure in 1984.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Current Population Survey (1984-2006) and
Job Tenure and Mobility Supplement (1983-2006).
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Table 2: Estimates of the Linear Probability Model of Job Loss, 1993-2005.
Controlling for tenure
Variable: 1993-1997 1997-2001 2001-2005
Age 20-34 -0.017∗∗ -0.015∗∗ -0.020∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Age 50-64 0.003 0.009∗∗ 0.013∗∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Female -0.010∗∗ -0.006∗∗ -0.008∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Nonwhite 0.001 0.005∗ 0.012∗∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
ED<12 0.014∗∗ 0.001 0.009∗∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
ED 13-15 0.001 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
ED≥16 -0.018∗∗ -0.012∗∗ -0.009∗∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Manufacturing 0.021∗∗ 0.043∗∗ 0.067∗∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Public sector -0.046∗∗ -0.052∗∗ -0.050∗∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Tenure <1 0.020∗∗ 0.027∗∗ 0.023∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Tenure 5-10 -0.057∗∗ -0.061∗∗ -0.060∗∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Tenure ≥ 10 -0.075∗∗ -0.076∗∗ -0.080∗∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Constant 0.124∗∗ 0.110∗∗ 0.110∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Year FEs yes yes yes
N 82,510 93,560 97,506
R-squared 0.0259 0.0317 0.0341
Note: Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
The dependent variable is one if a worker reports being displaced in
the three years prior to the survey (because of plant closure, position
abolished, or slack work) and zero otherwise. Sample excludes self-
employed individuals. The omitted age category is 35-49. The omitted
educational category is high school. Observations are weighted using
the CPS final weights. Note that total displacement rate for
1993-1997 was 8.5 percent, 1997-2001 was 8.1, and 2001-2005 was 8.6.
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Table 3: Estimates of the Linear Probability Model of Job Loss by Age, 1993-2005.
Age 35-49 Age 50-64
Variable: 1993-1997 2001-2005 1993-1997 2001-2005
Female -0.010∗∗ -0.009∗∗ -0.010∗ 0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Nonwhite -0.002 0.014∗∗ -0.002 0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005)
ED<12 0.010† 0.003 0.003 0.006
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
ED 13-15 0.008∗ 0.005 0.014∗∗ 0.013∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
ED≥16 -0.006† 0.000 -0.001 0.007
(0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
Manufacturing 0.024∗∗ 0.065∗∗ 0.032∗∗ 0.085∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Public sector -0.044∗∗ -0.052∗∗ -0.039∗∗ -0.048∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Tenure<1 0.021∗∗ 0.020∗∗ 0.016 0.026∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.009)
Tenure 5-10 -0.059∗∗ -0.066∗∗ -0.068∗∗ -0.066∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005)
Tenure≥10 -0.078∗∗ -0.082∗∗ -0.086∗∗ -0.087∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
Constant 0.141∗∗ 0.140∗∗ 0.132∗∗ 0.115∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005)
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 35,791 40,221 16,668 26,157
R-squared 0.0294 0.0384 0.0311 0.0442
Note: Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
The dependent variable is one if a worker reports being displaced in
the three years prior to the survey (because of plant closure, position
abolished, or slack work) and zero otherwise. Sample excludes self-
employed individuals. The omitted age category is 35-49. The omitted
educational category is high school. Observations are weighted using
the CPS final weights. Note that total displacement rate for
1993-1997 was 8.5 percent, 1997-2001 was 8.1, and 2001-2005 was 8.6.
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Table 5: Net Effect of Changes in Characteristics and Relationships on Displacement, 1996-
1998 vs. 2004-2006.
Characteristic: Endowment Coefficient Interaction Total
All
Age 0.14∗∗ 0.12 -0.07∗∗ 0.20
(0.01) (0.16) (0.02) (0.16)
Education -0.04∗∗ 0.24 -0.03∗∗ 0.17
(0.01) (0.20) (0.01) (0.20)
Manufacturing -0.30∗∗ 0.66∗∗ 0.21∗∗ 0.57∗∗
(0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.06)
Tenure -0.06∗∗ -0.22 0.00 -0.27
(0.02) (0.17) (0.01) (0.17)
Age 35-49
Education -0.01 0.04 -0.02† 0.02
(0.01) (0.30) (0.01) (0.30)
Manufacturing -0.24∗∗ 0.64∗∗ 0.15∗∗ 0.55∗∗
(0.02) (0.08) (0.02) (0.09)
Tenure 0.08∗∗ -0.39 0.00 -0.30
(0.03) (0.28) (0.01) (0.28)
Age 50-64
Education 0.06 0.26 -0.03 0.29
(0.04) (0.40) (0.06) (0.40)
Manufacturing -0.39∗∗ 0.83∗∗ 0.25∗∗ 0.68∗∗
(0.04) (0.11) (0.04) (0.12)
Tenure 0.12∗∗ 0.00 0.00 0.12
(0.04) (0.47) (0.02) (0.47)
Note: Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
Results are based on Tables 2, 3, 4, and the Appendix Table.
Table 6: Distribution of Tenure by Age, CPS 2006.
Age category: Tenure<1 Tenure 1-5 Tenure 5-10 Tenure≥10 Total
Age 20-34 17% 59% 20% 5% 101%
Age 35-49 8 34 25 33 100
Age 50-64 5 25 20 50 100
Source: Authors calculations based on the Current Population Survey 2006 and Job
Tenure and Mobility Supplement 2006.
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Table 7: Estimates of the Linear Probability Model of Job Loss without Controls for Tenure,
1993-2005 .
Without controlling for tenure
Variable: 1993-1997 1997-2001 2001-2005
Age 20-34 0.008∗∗ 0.012∗∗ 0.008∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Age 50-64 -0.007∗∗ -0.002 0.002
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Female -0.006∗∗ -0.001 -0.005∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Nonwhite 0.003 0.008∗∗ 0.015∗∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
ED<12 0.021∗∗ 0.009∗∗ 0.016∗∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
ED 13-15 0.002 0.003 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
ED≥16 -0.017∗∗ -0.011∗∗ -0.010∗∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Manufacturing 0.012∗∗ 0.034∗∗ 0.057∗∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Public sector -0.058∗∗ -0.064∗∗ -0.061∗∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Tenure <1 - - -
- - -
Tenure 5-10 - - -
- - -
Tenure ≥ 10 - - -
- - -
Constant 0.085∗∗ 0.070∗∗ 0.070∗∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Year FEs yes yes yes
N 82,510 93,560 97,506
R-squared 0.0119 0.0155 0.0188
Note: Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
The dependent variable is one if a worker reports being displaced in
the three years prior to the survey (because of plant closure, position
abolished, or slack work) and zero otherwise. Sample excludes self-
employed individuals. The omitted age category is 35-49. The omitted
educational category is high school. Observations are weighted using
the CPS final weights. Note that total displacement rate for
1993-1997 was 8.5 percent, 1997-2001 was 8.1, and 2001-2005 was 8.6.
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Table 8: Characteristics of the Workforce by Age and Year of the Survey, CPS 1996-2006.
All Age 35-49 Age 50-64
Variable: 1996-1998 2004-2006 1996-1998 2004-2006 1996-1998 2004-2006
Displacement rate 0.085 0.086 0.081 0.083 0.073 0.080
Age 20-34 0.380 0.345 - - - -
Age 50-64 0.192 0.251 - - - -
Female 0.471 0.472 0.475 0.473 0.476 0.488
Non-white 0.151 0.158 0.149 0.163 0.127 0.133
ED<12 0.097 0.090 0.086 0.085 0.129 0.081
ED 13-15 0.299 0.296 0.292 0.279 0.241 0.278
ED≥16 0.286 0.317 0.306 0.331 0.289 0.350
Manufacturing 0.187 0.142 0.193 0.156 0.200 0.154
Public sector 0.166 0.159 0.189 0.166 0.213 0.216
Tenure<1 0.099 0.090 0.070 0.063 0.045 0.043
Tenure 5-10 0.212 0.223 0.237 0.256 0.190 0.204
Tenure≥10 0.287 0.283 0.367 0.341 0.538 0.513
Note: A worker considered to be displaced if he/she reports losing a job in the three years prior to the
survey because of plant closure, position abolished, or slack work. Sample excludes self-employed
individuals. Observations are weighted using the Current Population Survey final weights.
Note that characteristics from Table 1 may not correspond to characteristics in Table 8 since Table 1 is
based on the March Supplement and Table 8 is based on the January Supplement to the CPS. January
Supplement is representative of workforce rather than overall population. While Table 1 is constructed
to demonstrate trends in population, Table 8 facilitates a Blinder–Oaxaca decomposition.
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